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Incremental International Tax Reform:
A Review of Selected Proposals
David L. Cameron' and Philip F. Postlewaite'
I. INTRODUCTION
Business people, tax practitioners, and legal academics generally agree
that the United States' international tax regime is broken. Criticisms
abound that the system is overly complicated, disadvantageous to American
businesses competing in a global economy, and frequently subject to
manipulation and abuse. In the recent past, individuals and groups across
the political spectrum have proposed numerous reforms to address these
problems, some of which seek simply to modify current requirements while
others jettison the current system in favor of dramatic alternatives.
The current United States international tax regime is frequently
referred to as a "worldwide" tax system because United States taxpayers,
including corporations formed in the United States, are subject to tax on
their worldwide income. However, the income of a foreign subsidiary of a
United States corporate parent is generally not taxable by the United States
until the earnings are returned to the United States, typically through the
payment of a dividend from the subsidiary to the parent. Thus, the
incorporation of a foreign subsidiary to engage in foreign business activities
allows the deferral of foreign income from United States tax. Nevertheless,
certain types of income of a foreign subsidiary that fall within the definition
of a Controlled Foreign Corporation may be taxable by the United States
under Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code.5 From this perspective, the
1 Associate Director, Tax Program, and Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School
of Law.
2 Director, Tax Program, and Harry R. Horrow Professor of Law, Northwestern
University School of Law.
PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE & STEPHANIE R. HOFFER, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION §§ 1.01 and
1.02 (5th ed. forthcoming 2010) (manuscript on file with authors). Foreign taxes paid on
foreign income are generally creditable against the income taxes imposed by the United
States under I.R.C. § 901. See infra notes 87-102 and accompanying text.
4 Id. at § 1.02. Such foreign taxes paid on foreign income by the subsidiary are creditable
against taxes imposed by the United States under § 902. See infra notes 103-116 and
accompanying text.
5 Id. at ch. 7. Other so-called "anti-deferral" provisions may also be applicable to other
types of income earned by a foreign corporation satisfying certain ownership requirements
by United States persons, such as Passive Foreign investment Companies. Id. at ch. 9.
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United States international tax regime is more accurately referred to as a
hybrid between a pure worldwide system and a territorial or exemption
system, under which income earned outside the United States would not be
subject to tax currently by the United States.
Two of the more ambitious proposals regarding international tax
reform have centered on implementing changes that would significantly
modify the current international tax regime. The first proposal would move
the current regime closer to an exemption or territorial system and provide
that foreign income, whether earned directly or through a foreign
subsidiary, would not be subject to United States taxation. Both the 2005
President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform and the Treasury
Department under the Bush Administration P1 roposed reforms that would
implement an exemption or territorial system. Proponents of a territorial or
exemption system claim that such an approach is necessary in order to
ensure that United States businesses are able to compete effectively with
foreign businesses in foreign markets. Moreover, these proponents point to
recent reforms adopted by the United Kingdom and Japan that move these
countries closer to such a system.8 However, critics of an exemption or
territorial system suggest that the benefits of deferral available under the
current United States international tax regime allow United States
businesses to avoid United States taxation of foreign income until the
income is repatriated to the United States sometime in the future, if ever,
thus undermining the asserted claims of exemption proponents.
The second proposal would move the current regime closer to a pure
worldwide tax system, sometimes referred to as a "full inclusion" system,
6 Countries with territorial systems are also more accurately referred to as adopting
hybrid systems because such systems typically do not exempt all earnings by foreign
subsidiaries from home-country taxation in order to prevent tax avoidance, particularly
earnings derived from mobile financial assets. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX
REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO Fix AMERICA'S TAX SYSTEM 103
(2005) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL].
PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 6, at 102-05, 132-35; OFFICE OF TAX
POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF
THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 54-63 (2007) [hereinafter
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS]. See also U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
TREASURY CONFERENCE ON BUSINESS TAXATION AND GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS
BACKGROUND PAPER (2007); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG.,
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE U.S. TAX POLICIES FOR
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 21-49 (Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter, JOINT COMMITTEE,
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS] (discussing the principal features and
structural issues presented by a territorial system).
Although a worldwide tax system was once prevalent among developed countries, less
than half of the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) have such a system. APPROACHES TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 7, at
57; PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 6, at 103. For a discussion of the British and
Japanese reform proposals, see APPROACHES TO IMPROVE COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 7, at
46-49.
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under which the foreign income of foreign subsidiaries would be attributed
to the United States parent.9 Proponents of such a system maintain that
exemption systems include their own set of incentives that distort
investment decisions by taxpayers that are more problematic than those that
exist under a properly designed full inclusion system.o As examples of
such inefficiencies, proponents of a full inclusion system point to incentives
under an exemption system to create tax haven finance subsidiaries, engage
in aggressive transfer pricing tactics, transform interest and royalty
payments into exempt dividends, and invest in low-tax foreign countries
rather than in their residence country or high-tax foreign countries despite
superior pre-tax returns in the latter countries." Proponents also point to a
lack of empirical evidence that a territorial system is necessary to allow the
United States multinationals to compete in a global economy.12 Finally,
proponents of full inclusion systems cite fairness considerations because,
under a territorial system, residents who earn foreign-source income are
allowed to avoid the tax burden borne by other residents who earn primarily
13domestic-source income.
Proposals that dramatically shift the United States international tax
system closer to a territorial system or to a full inclusion system are fraught
with technical difficulties and uncertainties. In addition, such proposals
strain an already polarized political system that must draft and consider
such complex legislation. As is frequently stated with respect to such
reform efforts, "the devil is in the details." Certainly, the rancorous and
divisive debate concerning health insurance reform over the past sixteen
months indicates that major reform efforts in an area with explosive
political potential must be undertaken under carefully controlled
circumstances. To the extent that economic and policy justifications can
9 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Logic of Subpart F: A Comparative Perspective, 79
TAx NOTES 1775 (1998); Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the
Income ofMultinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 18 (1993); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr.,
Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax
on Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REv. 455 (1999); Edward D. Kleinbard, Throw
Territorial Taxation from the Train, 114 TAX NOTES 547 (2007). For a discussion of the
principal features and structural issues presented by a full inclusion system, see JOINT
COMMITTEE, ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS, supra note 7, at 50-64.
10 J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Some Perspectives from
the United States on the Worldwide Taxation vs. Territorial Taxation Debate, 3 J.
AUSTRALASIAN TAX TEACHERS Ass'N 35, 42-50 (2008). Because of existing flaws in the
current United States international tax regime, Fleming, Peroni, and Shay admit that the
current regime should be replaced with a well-designed territorial system. However, they
stress that the appropriate debate is not between the current regime and a well-designed
territorial system but between a well-designed full inclusion system and a well-designed
territorial system. Id. at 38-40. In their view, a well-designed full inclusion system is
preferable to a well-designed territorial system.
" Id. at 42-46.
12 Id. at 46-49.
" Id. at 59-67.
567
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:565 (2010)
support an international tax regime that ranges from a full inclusion system
to a territorial system, presumably political agreement across the ideological
spectrum can be found to ensure that the current tax system does not burden
foreign income more heavily than a full inclusion system or provide
taxpayers with benefits that would not be available under a territorial
system. Yet, a number of commentators have observed that elements of the
current system result in exactly the latter situation: "the current U.S.
international rules allow U.S. multinationals to achieve outcomes that are
superior to exemption."1 4
Perhaps a more appropriate, and realistic, approach in such a situation
is simply to "muddle through" by proposing incremental, rather than
fundamental, changes to the status quo that move in the direction of
generally agreed upon policy objectives before tackling the more politically
difficult issues associated with fundamental reform.'5 In his first two
budget proposals for the 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, President Obama
appears to have adopted such an approach and has recommended several
modest (although some might say timid1 6) reforms to the United States
international tax regime.17 Three of those reform proposals are described
14 American Bar Association Section on Taxation, Report of the Task Force on
International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 689 (2006) [hereinafter ABA Task Force
Report]. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse Than
Exemption, 59 EMORY L.J. 79 (2009); Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some
U.S. Multinationals May Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They
Really Dislike), 59 SMU L. REV. 751 (2006). See also President's Advisory Panel, supra
note 6, at 104; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE
TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 189 (Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter
JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE].
1s See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through ", 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
79 (1959); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 517
(1979) (advocating evolutionary or gradual policy change).
16 Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Obama's International Tax Proposal Is Too Timid, 123 TAX
NOTES 738 (2009).
17 DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL
YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS 28-40 (2009) [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE
PROPOSALS]; DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS 39-50 (2010) [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2011
REVENUE PROPOSALS]. See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 11ITH CONG.,
DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2010
BUDGET PROPOSAL-PART THREE: PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF CROSS-
BORDER INCOME AND INVESTMENT (Comm. Print 2009) [hereinafter JOINT COMM.,
DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS]. The 2010 Revenue Proposals included the
following: (1) reform the business entity classification rules; (2) defer the deduction of
expenses, except R&E expenses, related to deferred income; (3) reform the foreign tax credit
by determining the credit on a pooling basis and (4) preventing the splitting of foreign
income and foreign taxes; (5) limit the shifting of income through intangible property
transfers; (6) limit earnings stripping by expatriated entities; (7) prevent the repatriation of
earnings in certain cross-border reorganizations; (8) repeal 80/20 company rules; (9) prevent
the avoidance of dividend withholding taxes; and (10) modify the tax rules for dual capacity
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below-the check-the-box rules, the foreign tax credit, and the rules
regarding domestic and foreign source income and deductions. These
proposals were selected, not because the proposals are uncontroversial and
should be immediately enacted, but because they may serve as illustrations
of incremental changes in the current United States international tax regime
that are worthy of serious consideration by all sides in the on-going debate
concerning international tax reform and, more importantly, as potential
stepping stones in the discussion of international tax reform proposals and
the development of a consensus regarding more comprehensive reform
proposals.
taxpayers. See FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSAL at 28-40. The 2011 Revenue
Proposals were the same as the 2010 Revenue Proposals except that items (1) and (6) were
excluded, (2) was modified, and two additional items-the current taxation of excess returns
associated with transfers of intangibles offshore and the disallowance of deductions for
excess non-taxed reinsurance premiums paid to affiliates-were included. See FISCAL YEAR
2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS at 39-50.
The Obama Administration proposals generated considerable commentary. See, e.g.,
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Obama's International Tax Plan a Major Step Forward, 123 TAX
NOTES 735 (2009); Robert H. Dilworth, Proposed Multilateral FTC Pooling and U.S.
Bilateral Tax Treaties, 124 TAX NOTES 1227 (2009); Michael C. Durst, The President's
International Tax Proposals in Historic Perspective, 123TAx NOTES 1269 (2009); James P.
Fuller, U.S. Tax Review: Obama Administration's Tax Proposals, 54 TAX NOTES INT'L 773
(2009); Erika Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association Submits Report on Various Obama
Administration International Tax Proposals, 2009 N.Y. ST. B.A. TAX SEC., available at
LEXIS, 2009 TNT 232-75 [hereinafter Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association]; James
Reardon & Jon Ohrn, The Practical Effects of the Obama International Tax Proposals, 124
TAX NOTES 999 (2009); John M. Samuels, American Tax Isolationism, 123 TAx NOTES 1593
(2009); Lee A. Sheppard, Defending the Obama International Proposals, 123 TAX NOTES
1391 (2009); Lee A. Sheppard, A Look at Obama 's International Proposals, 123 TAX NOTES
651(2009); Robert B. Stack, Danielle E. Rolfes, Joshua T. Brady & John D. Bates, Recent
International Tax Proposals Raise Technical Issues, 124 TAx NOTES 451 (2009); Martin A.
Sullivan, A Simple Overview of the Obama International Tax Proposals, 123 TAX NOTES
1301 (2009); Martin A. Sullivan, Obama Chooses a Clumsy Way to Limit Deferral, 123 TAX
NOTES 1163 (2009); Martin A. Sullivan, Will Obama's International Proposals Kill U.S.
Jobs?, 123 TAx NOTES 1063 (2009); Martin A. Sullivan, Obama Launches International
Reform: The Battle Begins, 123 TAx NOTES 646 (2009); Thompson, supra note 16; Mark A.
Weinberger, Six Observations on Obama's International Proposals, 123 TAX NOTES 1599
(2009); Joann M. Weiner, How Obama May Reform International Taxation, 122 TAx NOTES
1552 (2009). See also Amy S. Elliott, Obama's International Reforms Won't Create Jobs,
Analysts Say, 123 TAx NOTES 655 (2009); Chuck O'Toole, Obama Scales Back Tax Agenda
in Fiscal 2011 Budget, 126 TAx NOTES 691 (2010); Chuck O'Toole, Obama Presents
International Tax Reform Proposals, 123 TAx NOTES 643 (2009); Kristen A. Parillo &
David D. Stewart, Obama's Budget Drops Check-the-Box Repeal, 126 TAX NOTES 708
(2010); Kristen A. Parillo, Panelists Find Faults in Obama's International Tax Proposals,
123 TAX NOTES 1387 (2009); Kristen A. Parillo, Obama Plan Would Harm U.S.
Multinationals, Olson Says, 123 TAx NOTES 1088 (2009); Kristen Parillo, Randall Jackson,
Charles Gnaedinger & Robert Goulder, Treasury Details Obama's International Reform
Proposals, 123 TAx NOTES 792 (2009).
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II. THE CHECK-THE-BOX RULES
The check-the-box Regulations were introduced in 1997 and
constituted a radical departure from the prior classification criteria utilized
to distinguish corporations from partnerships for United States income tax
purposes. Since their introduction, the Regulations have become a part of
the everyday fabric of international tax planning. In fact, some
commentators have characterized the Regulations as "an unparalleled
planning tool to minimize both foreign and U.S. tax on non-U.S.
earnings."' As a consequence, it is unsurprising that the check-the-box
Regulations, and entity classification more generally, have been a target of
reform efforts in the international tax area.
Significant distinctions exist under the Internal Revenue Code between
the tax treatment of a corporation and a partnership.1 9 With respect to the
former, income is taxed at the entity level as earned and at the shareholder
level when distributed. Additionally, losses incurred by the entity cannot be
taken into account by its shareholders in order to offset other income. By
way of contrast, the income of a partnership is taxed directly to its partners,
and losses incurred by the entity are available to offset the partners' other
-20income.
A. Pre-Check-the-Box Classification Criteria for Enterprises
For tax purposes, whether an entity is classified as a partnership or as a
corporation for tax purposes has been a difficult issue because of the
vagueness of the sections of the Internal Revenue Code that define various
2i 1 -2entities. The Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Commissioner2 held that
unincorporated organizations that "resemble" corporations could be
associations taxable as corporations. The Court identified seven major
corporate characteristics and stated that an organization resembled a
corporation if it had more corporate than non-corporate characteristics. Six
of the characteristics noted in Morrissey were embraced by the Regulations
as the elements of the entity classification determination: associates; an
objective to carry on business for profit; continuity of life; centralized
management; limited liability; and free transferability of beneficial
interest.23
The Regulations (also known as the "Kintner Reulations," based on a
tax classification opinion in Kintner v. United States), in effect from 1960
18 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 668.
19 See I.R.C. §§ 770 1(a)(2), (3) (2006). See also I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (2006).
20 See generally ARTHUR B. WILLIS & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
chs. 1, 3, 21 (7th ed. 2008).
21 See I.R.C. §§ 761(a), 7701(a) (2006).
22 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
23 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960). See T.D. 6503, 25 Fed. Reg. 10,928 (1960).
24 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
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to 1996, employed these six characteristics for determining whether an
organization more nearly resembled a corporation than a partnership (or
trust) for classification purposes. The first two characteristics, associates
and an objective to carry on business for profit, were ignored when
determining whether an organization was classified as a partnership or as an
association taxable as a corporation because they were common to both
types of entities. The four remaining characteristics-continuity of life,
centralized management, limited liability, and free transferability of
interests-were used to determine an entity's tax classification.
According to those Regulations, an entity was classified as an
association taxable as a corporation only if it possessed more corporate than
non-corporate characteristics. Furthermore, although not specifically stated
in the Regulations, each corporate characteristic was weighted equally.
Thus, provided two of the four corporate characteristics were lacking,
partnership status was assured. A general partnership formed under a statute
conforming to the uniform partnership acts typically was classified as a
partnership. At a minimum, it lacked limited liability and continuity of life.
Although it might have centralized management and free transferability of
interests, two of the characteristics were not enough for association status.
The limited liability company is an unincorporated business entity that
basically is a cross between a closely-held corporation and a limited
partnership. Limited liability company acts began to emerge in the United
States during the late 1970s. The Internal Revenue Service wrestled for
some time with whether a limited liability company should be classified for
tax purposes by applying the characteristics of the Regulations or whether
the fact of limited liability alone should require its classification as a
corporation. Finally, it applied the Regulations and ruled that a multi-
member limited liability company was to be taxed as a partnership.2 5
B. Adoption of Elective Classification Regime-Check-the-Box
Regulations
Given the partnership bias of the Regulations, it became virtually
impossible for an unincorporated entity that wished to be taxed as a
partnership not to be able to do so through proper drafting of the organizing
and operating agreements. Furthermore, the proliferation of state laws
providing for limited liability companies eliminated one of the reasons,
limited liability, for an entity to incorporate. As a result, the Treasury
Department and the Internal Revenue Service concluded that the rules of
the Regulations had become formalistic and, in effect, permitted well-
advised taxpayers to choose their taxable status by proper draftsmanship of
the entity's governing agreements. A simpler, more flexible approach to the
classification issue was sought.
25 See generally WILIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 20, at ch. 1.
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In 1995, the Internal Revenue Service announced that it was
considering allowing taxpayers to treat unincorporated entities as
partnerships or corporations on an elective basis. Proposed Regulations
were issued in 1996 to replace the corporate resemblance test of the prior
Regulations. They were enthusiastically received as simplifying and
liberalizing the entity classification rules and promptly were colloquially
dubbed the check-the-box Regulations. The Treasury Department finalized
the Regulations effective January 1, 1997.
C. Overview
The check-the-box Regulations completely replaced their prior
counterparts.26 They radically altered the classification criteria for tax
treatment of an entity as a partnership or a corporation and introduced the
concept of a disregarded entity.
The overall effect of the check-the-box Regulations is that an
unincorporated entity recognized for federal tax purposes as an entity
separate from its owners, engaged in business, and not a trust or a
corporation is an eligible entity. An eligible entity with two or more
members may elect to be classified and taxed either as a partnership or as an
association taxable as a corporation. An eligible entity with only one
member may elect to be classified as an association taxable as a corporation
or to be a disregarded entity with its income taxed to its sole member, i.e.,
owner. 27
If the entity does not make an affirmative election as to its tax
classification, it is determined under default provisions. The default
provisions basically favor non-corporate classification for domestic entities.
The default rules are different in the foreign context as they turn upon the
concept of limited liability. If no member of the entity is liable under local
law for the debts of the enterprise, an eligible entity which has not made an
election defaults to corporate status. If liability for the debts of the
enterprise exists for any member, the default classification status is a
partnership if there are two or more members or a disregarded entity if there
is only one.
D. Qualification
The Regulations provide a brief summary of the classification
procedure and focus primarily on the method of determining whether an
enterprise qualifies as an entity for classification purposes.2 Thereafter,
they provide the method of determining whether an entity is a business
26 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -3 (as amended in 1996).
27 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 1996).
28 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (as amended in 2009).
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entity.29 They then identify a business entity that is an eligible entity and
detail the choice of tax classification available to that entity. 30 Thus, three
basic considerations are necessary to determine if an unincorporated
enterprise is entitled to make the classification election: (1) whether the
enterprise is considered to be an entity for federal income tax purposes; (2)
if the enterprise is considered to be an entity, whether it is a business entity;
and (3) if the enterprise is a business entity, whether it is an eligible entity.
E. Entity
In order for an enterprise to be entitled to elect its classification for tax
purposes, the check-the-box Regulations require that it must be considered
an entity separate from its owners.32 The Code defines a "partnership" as
including "a syndicate, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated
organization through or by means of which any business, financial
operation, or venture is carried on, and which is not .. . a corporation or a
trust or estate."33 Whether an enterprise qualifies as an entity for purposes
of the check-the-box Regulations is a matter of Federal income tax law.
The Regulations do not provide specific criteria for what constitutes an
entity. They provide in general terms that "[a] joint venture or other
contractual arrangement may create a separate entity for federal tax
purposes if the participants carry on a trade, business, financial operation, or
venture and divide the profits therefrom." 3 4 The operation of a trade or
business or a financial operation or venture and a sharing of profits govern
the existence of a separate entity.
The Regulations also provide that a joint undertaking merely to share
expenses, such as two people jointly constructing a ditch to drain surface
water from their property, does not create a separate entity. Similarly,
joint ownership of property that is kept in repair and rented does not
constitute a separate entity. However, if the joint owners of property, e.g.,
an apartment building, in addition to renting space in the building also
provide services to the tenants, a separate entity exists, because the
providing of services constitutes the conduct of a business.
F. Business Entity
To be able to elect its classification for federal income tax purposes, an
enterprise that qualifies as an entity also must qualify as a business entity,
29 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 2009).
30 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006).
30 Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (as amended in 2006).
32 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (as amended in 2009).
" I.R.C. § 761(a) (2006). See also I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (2006).
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which the Regulations define as "any entity recognized for federal tax
purposes (including an entity with a single owner that may be disregarded
as an entity separate from its owner . . .) that is not properly classified as a
trust . . . or otherwise subject to special treatment under the Internal
Revenue Code."06 The Regulations thus categorize all entities as either
business entities or trusts. Whether an entity is classified as a trust, thereb
preventing it from being a business entity, depends on the type of trust.
The Regulations refer to various types of trusts, only some of which are
treated as trusts instead of business entities.
G. Eligible Entity
A business entity that qualifies as an eligible entity and has two or
more members may elect to be classified for income tax purposes either as a
partnership or as an association taxable as a corporation. An eligible entity
that has only one member may elect to be classified as an association
taxable as a corporation or to be a disregarded entity with its income taxed
to its owner.
An eligible entity is any business entity which is not identified in eight
categories of the Regulations. An entity referenced therein is denied the
ability to elect its classification for federal income tax purposes. Instead, it
is classified as a per se corporation and taxed as such.
As the election is intended to be available to unincorporated entities,
the Regulations enumerate those entities which possess, or are deemed to
possess, characteristics identical to, or functionally equivalent to, those of
incorporated entities. The most common types of per se corporations
designated by the Regulations are business entities organized under a
federal or state statute that are referred to as incorporated or as a
corporation and certain designated business entities formed in one of
approximately eighty listed foreign countries.4 0 Per se corporations are
classified as corporations for Federal income tax purposes and are thus
ineligible to elect their tax classification.
In the international context, one of the more puzzling aspects of the
check-the-box regime is the uncertain motivation and rationale for the per
se status of various entities in different foreign countries. At a minimum,
one would have thought that there would be a per se entity for each country
in the world. However, with the world currently containing more than 150
countries, a list identifying only 80 countries is incomplete. As a
36 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (as amended in 2009). An eligible entity with a single
owner can elect to be classified as an association or to be disregarded as an entity separate
from its owner. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006).
3 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (as amended in 1996).
38 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
39 d.
40 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1), (8).
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consequence, in those non-listed countries, any enterprise regardless of size,
characteristic, similarity with the domestic concept of corporate existence,
etc. may elect to check the box. This "entitlement by all" stands in stark
contrast to domestic entities of the United States. Every incorporated
enterprise in the United States, regardless of size or shape, is a per se
corporation. As a consequence, if incorporated in the United States, the
entity is precluded from eligible entity status and electing its tax
classification under the check-the-box regime.
Even the listed per se business types for the eighty foreign countries
fail to possess equivalent characteristics. For example, for most of South
America, the per se entity that is precluded from the elective process is the
"Sociedad An6nima." This business form closely approximates that
utilized by the United States since virtually any incorporated enterprise
(public or private) is precluded from checking the box with regard to its
classification for tax purposes. However, in the United Kingdom and other
countries, e.g., Canada, the Netherlands, and Australia, the per se
designation applies exclusively to publicly traded enterprises. Accordingly,
a greater number of enterprises in those jurisdictions may check the box
than would comparable enterprises in other parts of the world. Such
inconsistent line drawing is difficult to defend.
H. Elective Classification
An eligible entity may elect its classification for Federal income tax
purposes. If it has two or more members, it may elect to be classified either
as an association, and thus taxed as a corporation, or as a partnership.41 If
the eligible entity has only a single owner, it may elect to be classified
either as an association, taxed as a corporation, or to be disregarded as an
entity and have its income taxed to its owner.4 2 It is not necessary for the
entity to affirmatively make a classification election. The classification
process is greatly simplified by default classification provisions.4 3
A domestic eligible entity that does not make an election automatically
is classified as a partnership if it has two or more members. Such an entity
that has a single owner is disregarded as an entity separate from its owner if
it does not make an election." In the foreign context, as discussed above,
the default rules turn on whether all of the members of the entity possess
limited liability for the debts of the enterprise.45 If so, the default
classification is corporate status. If any member possesses personal
liability, the default classification is partnership or disregarded entity status
depending upon the number of owners.
41 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
42 id.
43 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b).
4 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1).
45 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2).
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I. Tax Consequences of an Election
A multi-member domestic entity entitled to elect under the check-the-
box Regulations (C-T-B Regulations) will be treated by the United States
for Federal income tax purposes as either a corporation or a partnership. If
it elects corporate status, its income will be taxed to the entity as earned and
at the shareholder level when distributed, while its losses will not flow
through to its shareholders. If instead partnership status is elected (or if the
entity fails to elect), the members will be subject to tax directly on the
income generated and losses will flow through to the partners.4 6
A single-member domestic entity entitled to elect under the check-the-
box Regulations will be classified by the United States for income tax
purposes as either a corporation or a disregarded entity. If it elects
corporate status, its income will be taxed to the entity as earned and at the
shareholder level when distributed, while its losses will not flow through to
its shareholders. Alternatively, if disregarded entity status is elected (or if
the entity fails to elect), "its activities are treated in the same manner as a
sole proprietorship, branch or division of the owner."4 7 The eligible entity,
recognized as such under state law, disappears and becomes a "tax
nothing." Accordingly, the income that it earns is taxed to its sole member.
Under the check-the-box Regulations, a single-member limited
liability company constitutes an eligible entity. An eligible entity may elect
its classification for Federal income tax purposes. Where the eligible entity
has only a single owner, it may elect to be classified either as an
association, taxed as a corporation, or to be disregarded as an entity. A
disregarded entity is viewed as a division or a branch of its owner, and the
income that it earns is taxed to its sole member.48
If an eligible entity is classified as a disregarded entity, "its activities
are treated in the same manner as a sole proprietorship, branch or division
of the owner." 4 9 The eligible entity, while recognized as such under state
law, disappears for Federal income tax purposes. The disregarded entity is
not taxed on the income which it earned. Instead, the single-member owner
is deemed to have earned the income, which is included with its other
worldwide income.
If a single-owner limited liability company for United States federal
income tax purposes elects to be treated as a disregarded entity, i.e., as a
branch or a division of its owner, or fails to elect a classification, it will not
be classified as a corporation. Accordingly, under United States federal
income tax law, the income earned by the disregarded entity in a particular
foreign country as well as that derived from the United States or other
4 See, WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 20, ch. 1.
47 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a).
48 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a).
49 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a).
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foreign countries would be reported by, and taxable to, its sole
member/owner.
J. Hybrid Entities
Under the check-the-box regime, hybrid status, i.e., a classification as
a transparent enterprise in one jurisdiction and a separate taxable entity in
another at the same time, is easily accomplished. Under the prior
classification regime, such simultaneous dual status was difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve.
Hybrid entities give rise to numerous tax planning opportunities. By
way of example, if an enterprise is treated as a foreign corporation for
United States tax purposes but as a partnership by a foreign jurisdiction,
the income derived by that entity will possibly not be taxed by the foreign
jurisdiction, which considers the income to flow through to its members,
while the income may not be taxed by the United States because it is
derived by a foreign corporation.so
There are four logical structures from the perspective of the United
States which can arise-(I) a domestic regular hybrid entity (formed in
the United States, treated as a transparent partnership by the United States
and as an opaque separate entity by the foreign jurisdiction); (2) a foreign
regular hybrid entity (formed outside the United States, treated as
transparent by the United States and as an opaque separate entity by the
foreign jurisdiction); (3) a domestic reverse hybrid entity (formed in the
United States, treated as a separate entity by the United States but as
transparent by the foreign jurisdiction); and (4) a foreign reverse hybrid
entity (formed outside the United States, treated as a separate entity by the
United States and as transparent by the foreign jurisdiction).
As discussed below, these structures have become the everyday work
tools of international practitioners. The ability to take a single enterprise
and yet treat it as transparent for the tax purposes of one jurisdiction and
as a separate entity in another opens possible tax savings structures
previously unimagined.
K. Tax Treaties
While hybrid entities permeate international tax structures, many of
those structures emanate from countries with which the United States has
tax treaties." The emergence of hybrid entities has also generated
difficulties in the context of tax treaties. Of particular concern is the issue
of residence. Since many treaties were entered before the check-the-box
regime was adopted, an issue arises as to whether the entity, it members,
50 See discussion infra accompanying notes 60-64 regarding other planning techniques
available under the check-the-box regime.
5' See POSTLEWATE & HOFFER, supra note 3, at chs. 12-14.
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both the entity and the members, or neither the entity nor its members
constitute a resident thereunder, a pre-condition to the utilization of the
treaty and the receipt of the beneficial treatment provided therein.
Given the dates of entry of many treaties and the recent emergence of
the concept, the Treasury, in order to address some of these issues,
unilaterally promulgated the § 894 Regulations to address such settings.52
The general rule advanced by the Regulations is that an entity organized in
a foreign country can only claim treaty benefits on the receipt of United
States-source passive income if the entity is considered a "resident" of that
country for tax purposes (i.e., the entity is not transparent).53 If the entity is
treated as transparent by that country, its members may claim treaty benefits
if they are taxable on that income as "residents" of the foreign treaty
partner. 54  The tax laws of the state in which the entities or members
claiming treaty benefits reside are controlling, not the tax laws of the United
States in which the income is sourced.5
While the adoption of the Regulation eases the tension for inbound
transactions (investment in the United States by foreign persons) involving
passive income, interpretive difficulties continue for outbound activities
(investment in foreign countries by United States persons). Few treaties
address hybrid entities directly.
The partnership provisions of most older bilateral tax treaties, i.e.,
those predating the check-the-box regulations, are uncertain in their
application. Given the dearth of hybrid structures when these treaties were
entered, it is difficult, if not impossible, to intuit how the treaty drafters
would have applied the partnership and corporate provisions of the treaty to
the current, more advanced business structures. More modem treaties
depart slightly from the older treaties with new textual language that
appears to expand the scope of the provision beyond traditional
partnerships, i.e., limited liability companies and the like. This expanded
scope is more susceptible, albeit not explicit, in its possible application to
hybrid structures. Some of the accompanying technical explanations to
these treaties contain text and examples dealing explicitly with hybrid
entities. Finally, given the omnipresence of hybrid structures, treaties in
recent years are beginning to possess actual text that clearly addresses the
tax issues arising in the hybrid context.
United States tax treaties can be grouped into three main categories
with regard to their application to hybrid entities. All embrace the
traditional rule that the tax laws of the country of residence are controlling
in the determination of qualification for treaty benefits. These three
categories are illustrated by the United States tax treaties with India
52 Treas. Reg. § 1.894-1(d) (as amended in 2002).
53 Treas. Reg. § 1.894-l(d)(1) (as amended in 2002).
54 id.
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.894-l(d)(3)(ii) and (iii) (as amended in 2002).
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("partnerships"), the United Kingdom ("person that is fiscally transparent"),
and Japan ("without regard to whether the income is treated as the income
of such . . . members . . . under the tax laws of the first mentioned
Contracting State"), respectively.56
The United States-India treaty illustrates the traditional partnership
language, found mainly in older treaties. The more modem approach,
typified by the United States-United Kingdom treaty, adheres to the
principles of the traditional approach, but the wording of the text is more
broadly focused through the use of the term "transparent entities," which
should include limited liability companies, etc.58 The recent United States-
Japan tax treaty contains a detailed provision addressing specifically hybrid
entities. 59 Therein, precise rules are prescribed for the determination of
when and to whom an income item is eligible for treaty benefits when the
transaction involves hybrid structures.
Despite the different wording of these three different treaty approaches
to the issue, they share the same underlying premise that either the entity or
its members must be taxable residents of a treaty country in order to claim
treaty benefits. While the differing versions should likely be interpreted
consistently when applied to varying hybrid entity scenarios, the lack of
specificity in older treaties produces less than perfect certainty. As a
consequence, if the check-the-box regime continues, treaties will need to be
renegotiated with the addition of specific provisions addressing the
difficulties of hybrid entities.
L. Examples of Tax Planning Through the Check-the-Box Regime
Hybrid entity structures give rise to significant tax planning flexibility,
particularly with regard to the deferral of income and the utilization of
foreign tax credits, which appears to produce unintended results. 60 Regular
hybrid enterprises (transparent for purposes of the tax law of the United
States, but treated as a separate entity for foreign tax purposes) and reverse
hybrids (separate entity for United States purposes but transparent for
foreign) now populate the terrain. The check-the-box regulations have
expanded the number of settings where this issue comes into play, because
"the regime has tended to multiply the situations in which there is a
56 Philip F. Postlewaite, Stephanie R. Hoffer & Matthew Kemp, The Adaptation of U.S.
Tax Treaties to Changing Business Forms-A Case Study of Hybrid Entities, INT'L TAX J.,
Sept. 2009, at 33.
5 Tax Convention, U.S.-India, art. 4, Sept. 12, 1989, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 101-5 (1991).
58 Tax Convention, U.S.-U.K., art. 4, Jul. 24, 2001, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 107-19 (2003).
59 Tax Convention, U.S.-Japan Tax Treaty, art. 4, Nov. 6, 2003, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 108-
14(2004).
60 See generally Mary C. Bennett, Whose Tax Is It Anyway? Foreign Tax Credits in a
Check-the Box World, TAXES: THE TAX MAGAZINE, Mar. 2005, at 35; Philip F. Postlewaite,
The Check the Box Regulations Turn Ten-Will We Survive Their Teenage Years?, 6 J. OF
TAX'N. OF GLOBAL TRAN. 35 (2006).
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mismatch between United States and foreign concepts of whose income is
being subjected to the foreign tax."61
M. Check-The-Box Election for Maximizing Available Credits
Taxpayers typically have either excess credits or an excess limitation.
Rare is the case where a taxpayer's maximum foreign tax credit is identical
to the amount of the foreign income taxes imposed. Thus, in both settings,
planning opportunities are presented. Those taxpayers with an excess
limitation might consider releasing foreign tax credits for use on their
United States tax return. Taxpayers in an excess credit position might
consider releasing low-taxed foreign source income.
Such timing efforts can be facilitated through the use of separate
subsidiaries and the availability of the check-the-box election.62 If a
domestic parent has a number of subsidiaries, it can release the high-taxed
or low-taxed results as needed through the use of such an election. The
release of income from a high-taxed jurisdiction will not generate residual
tax to the United States since the inclusion of that income, while taxable,
will be at a rate lower than the rate at which the foreign tax was imposed.
Similarly, release of income from a low-taxed jurisdiction may generate
additional domestic tax but, if excess credits are already available, the effect
of the inclusion will be minimized.
If a subsidiary is available with the desired profile based on the
domestic parent's overall tax situation, an election under the check-the-box
regulations to make it a disregarded entity could result in the flooding of the
pre-election credit position with the desired tax attributes of the converted
subsidiary. As illustrated in Diagram 1, various structures might permit
such opportunities.
61 See Bennett, supra note 60, at 35.
62 Because both subsidiaries are wholly-owned by a United States person, each will be
classified as a Controlled Foreign Corporation ("CFC"). Under §§ 951-964, some or all of
the earnings of the foreign subsidiaries may be imputed to its United States shareholders if
derived from specified types of income deemed by Congress to be abusive. As with all
international structuring, designs to maximize the availability of the foreign tax credit may
collide with particular features of the CFC safeguard provisions. See POSTLEWAITE &
HOFFER, supra note 3, at chs. 6, 7.
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affiliated companies, all of which are CFCs, one based in a high-tax country
and the other based in a low-tax jurisdiction, tinkering may prove
advantageous for maximizing the availability of foreign tax credits. By
having separate enterprises with different taxing climates and earnings
profiles, the United States parent corporation, through the judicious use of
the check-the-box election, can instantly mix the results of either of its
CFCs with its own. Thus, in the excess credit setting, it may elect to treat
the low taxed affiliate as a disregarded entity. Should an excess limitation
exist, the election might be employed for the high tax enterprise.
N. Check-and-Sell
The check-and-sell technique has produced significant benefits in
the Subpart F area by permitting the avoidance of current imputation of the
sales proceeds to the United States shareholders. As a general proposition
in the international arena, deferral of the payment of tax to the United States
is a most desirable goal. Similarly, such a technique may afford benefits for
purposes of effective tax planning regarding the foreign tax credit.6 3
As illustrated in Diagram 2, the technique involves a pre-sale
election on behalf of the foreign subsidiary to convert its tax status from
that of a corporation to that of a disregarded entity.
Diagram 2
Before After
Third US Co Third
US Co Party Party
Purchaser Purchaser
CFC 'F
The technique may produce benefits, because it may avoid the
passive basket limitation. A sale of stock will often trigger passive income
and a minimal amount of foreign tax due to treaty or statutory treatment of
the income from the sale of capital assets. While a taxpayer is enthusiastic
63 See POSTLEWAITE & HOFFER, supra note 3, at ch. 6; Dover v. Commissioner, 122 T.C.
234 (2004).
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about blending low-taxed income with high-taxed income, the existence of
the basket regime minimizes the taxpayer's ability to do so in many cases.
However, if the check-the-box election is employed pre-sale, the
sale is conceptualized as a sale of business assets. An important
requirement for characterizing the sale as an asset sale is that the assets are
those of the parent company. In certain situations, the Regulations
explicitly treat the business assets of a subsidiary as those of the parent
64
corporation.
0. Proposals for Reform
A high level Treasury official once compared the check-the-box
Regulations to the war in Iraq: "It was the right thing to do, the concept was
correct, the timing was right, but the process was flawed and we didn't give
enough thought as to the follow-up." 65 Even with this recognition, the
Treasury official recommended that the excesses of the check-the-box
Regulations be revisited but thought any cure to its defects should be
piecemeal at best: "I see the resolution as limiting its application in
'inappropriate' cases, enabling the benefits of the current rules to flow as I
and many of us intended ...
As illustrated above, the latitude afforded international tax
transactions through the use of the check-the-box regime has been
extraordinary. The commentary surrounding the beneficence bestowed by
the Regulations on the international tax planner has been characterized in
the extreme, ranging from the all-time Christmas gift to "an unparalleled
planning tool to minimize both foreign and U.S. tax on non-U.S.
earnings."67 What previously could not be accomplished with a particular
structure that lacked the flexibility of the current regime is now within the
realm of the possible by simply revisiting the proposed structure and
employing various aspects of the check-the-box regime.
As noted by the ABA Task Force: "[t]he ability to employ
inconsistently classified entities in foreign structures to achieve planning
objectives" combined with "the relatively 'frictionless' ability to change a
foreign entity's form for U.S. tax purposes" has created near boundless
68
opportunities. These changes have put "pressure on the structural
infirmities of other tax rules."69 The innumerable planning opportunities
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(e)(3).
65 Lowell D. Yoder, International Taxation: Re-Thinking Check-the-Box, TAxEs: THE
MAGAZINE, Mar. 2005, at 27, 28 (quoting Joe Guttentag).
66 Id.
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facilitated by the regime produces benefits previously unimagined:
"[d]eferral, cross-crediting of foreign tax credits, overly favorable source
rules, and other second-best structural features of the U.S. international
rules" have been pushed beyond their intended limits when combined with
the elective classification regime.70
As a consequence, because of the extraordinary impact ushered in
by the new approach, an increasing number of commentators and critics
have called for reform. Some have suggested that the Regulations were
invalid when issued. While various circuit courts of appeal have upheld
them, none has addressed directly the mutually exclusive nature of the
statutory language. Others have proposed improvements, and some have
called for outright withdrawal of the Regulations in the international
context.
P. Invalidation of the Check-the-Box Regime
While uncertainty persists as to what the determinative criteria is
and/or should be through which to differentiate partnerships from
corporations, it has been suggested that one thing is certain: Two
enterprises identical in every respect must be classified similarly.7
Congress clearly did not intend that identical enterprises could be classified
differently. However, under the check-the-box regime, identical
unincorporated enterprises can be treated differently for tax purposes.
Invalidation of the Regulation would eliminate much of the current chaos
found in the international arena.72
Two circuit courts of appeal have upheld the Regulations, but in
contexts in which the taxpayers were attempting to avoid liability for their
acts. The difficulty in challenging the regime is one of standing, since
those reformers eager to challenge the legitimacy of the Regulations lack
the jurisdictional prerequisite to do so.
Q. Limitation of the Check-the-Box Regime to Domestic Entities
Another proposal has been the elimination of the election for
foreign enterprises and the elevation of the default rule for such enterprises
70 id.
71 Philip F. Postlewaite & John S. Pennell, The Partnership Tax Proposals of the Joint
Committee on Taxation- "Houston, We Have a Problem," 76 TAx NOTES 527 (1997).
72 See generally, WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 20, at ch 1.
7 See Littriello v. United States, 484 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that § 7701
was ambiguous and that the Supreme Court's decision in Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296
U.S. 344 (1935), did not preclude the promulgation of reasonable Regulations); McNamee v.
Dep't of Treasury, 488 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that the Treasury's regulatory
efforts in promulgating the check-the-box Regulations were "a permissible construction of
the statute").
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to govern their classification.7 4 The historic hallmark of corporate status
has been limited liability by owners for the debts of the enterprise.
Substituting such an approach would give a consistent classification
standard and a change in status would require a real world, substantive
event (the acquisition or loss of personal liability) leading to potential tax
consequences or the expansion of the owner(s)' personal liability for debts
of the enterprise with potential real world consequences.
R. Joint Committee Proposal
Under the proposal of the Joint Committee on Taxation,
disregarded entity status would no longer be available.7 5 Any single-owner,
foreign business enterprise would be classified as a foreign corporation.76
While such a proposal would limit some of the planning techniques
discussed above, it appears to leave untouched entities with multiple
owners. Particularly in light of the rampant use of special allocations in the
international arena, one would imagine that many of the planning structures
which employ a single-owner enterprise would work themselves into a
partnership context in which the other partner would have little more than a
de minimis interest.
S. Task Force of the ABA Tax Section
The Task Force of the American Bar Association's Tax Section
appears to both embrace the Joint Committee Proposal as well as offer an
alternative. Under its alternative, the Task Force would require that foreign
entities which are subject to a comprehensive entity level tax by a foreign
jurisdiction be classified as a corporation for tax purposes.7 7 For those
foreign entities not subject to a comprehensive entity level tax, partnership
or disregarded entity status would be mandated depending upon the number
of owners. As noted by its report, "this alternative would align the U.S.
entity classification more closely with the treatment of the entity for foreign
tax purposes," which would reduce "the availability of deferral to
circumstances where an entity-level tax is imposed."78
T. The Obama Administration
The most recent entry into the sweepstakes for altering the current
check-the-box regime is that of the Obama Administration. As part of the
74 See WILLIS & POSTLEWAITE, supra note 20, at ch. 1; Postlewaite, supra note 60, at 51-
52.
7 JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE, supra note 14, at 183.
76 Id.
n ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 669.
71 Id. at 670.
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revenue proposals for the 2010 fiscal year, it proposed modifying the
check-the-box rules with regard to their use in international transactions.
Under the proposal, disregarded entity status would generally not be
available. Instead, such an entity would be classified as a corporation for
tax purposes, albeit with two exceptions. First, an entity may elect to be
classified as disregarded if the entity is created or organized in the same
foreign country as its owner. 80 Second, first-tier foreign eligible entities
would also be able to elect disregarded entity status subject to a tax
avoidance motivation.8 '
In reviewing the Obama Administration's proposal, the staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation expressed several concerns. 82  The first
concerned its effectiveness, particularly with respect to the two exceptions:
"Without additional guidance, these exceptions may permit taxpayers to
engage in tax planning that could significantly undermine the intent of the
proposal." Additionally, the staff observed that, because of the proposal's
inapplicability to domestic enterprises and the differing standards for the
determination of residency, such entities could be employed to produce the
same results.84 Finally, the staff expressed concern that the use of a
"nominal second owner" could circumvent the application of the safeguard
legislation.ss
Significantly, the staff strongly suggested that the Administration's
proposal did not go far enough. It noted that "[w]hile the proposal would
address a variety of planning techniques that facilitate the avoidance of
subpart F, it would leave untouched a significant range of other tax
minimization strategies that also make use of inconsistent U.S. and foreign
classifications. The proposal thus presents an opportunity to consider more
generally the circumstances in which any inconsistency between the U.S.
and foreign classifications of a business entity should be tolerated."8 6
7 FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 28. The Obama
administration did not retain the proposal in its revenue proposals for the 2011 fiscal year.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at I 10-15.
83 Id. at 112.
84 id.
85 Id.
"6 Id. at 114.
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III. THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT
A. Overview of the Foreign Tax Credit
United States individuals and corporations are taxable on their
worldwide income. As a result, such taxpayers are subject to potential
taxation in two places: the jurisdiction from which they derive their income
(the country of source) and the jurisdiction in which they are organized or
resident (the country of residence). Thus, a United States individual or
corporation earning $500 in State X may be taxed by both State X
(assuming a twenty-five percent rate yielding a $125 tax) and the United
States (assuming a thirty-five percent rate yielding a $175 tax). Without
relief in one or both of the jurisdictions, the tax bill on $500 of income
would be $300, imposing upon the taxpayer an effective tax rate of sixty
percent.
This duplication of tax could have a particularly deleterious effect
on international trade and investment. To prevent double taxation of
foreign source income, the United States has adopted a foreign tax credit by
which it extends a dollar-for-dollar credit against the taxes that it would
otherwise levy against foreign income for any foreign taxes that are paid.
Through the use of such a credit, the United States as the country of
residence defers to the taxing jurisdiction of the country of source. Thus, in
the above example, a foreign tax credit for the corporation's State X tax
payments would eliminate the United States tax and yield an overall tax rate
of forty percent on the income derived in State X. The credit is available to
domestic individuals (residents and citizens) and corporations, as well as
non-resident individuals and foreign corporations deriving income
effectively connected with the conduct of a United States trade or
business.89
8 POSTLEWAITE & HOFFER, supra note 3, at §§ 1.01 and 1.02.
8 I.R.C. § 901(b)(1) (2006) (allowing a credit against United States taxes by a United
States citizen and a domestic corporation for foreign and possession "income, war profits,
and excess profits taxes"). Alternatively, a deduction for such taxes is available under
§ 164(a)(3). A taxpayer must select either the credit or the deduction. In most cases, the
§ 901 credit is more advantageous than the deduction because a credit reduces tax on a
dollar-for-dollar basis, while a deduction merely reduces the amount of income upon which
the tax will be levied. The credit may also be favored because § 265(a)(1) denies a
deduction for expenses (including foreign taxes) allocable to income exempt from United
States tax, while the § 901 credit may be taken even though the foreign tax in question is
attributable to such income. For purposes of the foreign tax credit, a foreign levy is
considered a creditable tax if it is a compulsory payment under the authority of that country
to levy taxes and it is not compensation for a specific economic benefit provided by the
foreign country. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i) (2008). See generally POSTLEWAITE &
HOFFER, supra note 3, at §§ 6.02 and 6.06.
89 I.R.C. H§ 901(a), 906(a) (2006).
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B. The Foreign Tax Credit Limitation
In order to preserve its ability to tax United States source income in
full, the foreign tax credit is limited. In the absence of such a limitation, the
taxes paid on foreign source income would be credited against the taxes
imposed by the United States on income derived in the United States. For
example, if a fifty percent tax rate were applicable to a United States
individual or corporation earning $500 in State Y, the foreign taxes paid
would be $250. If that same taxpayer derives an additional $500 of income
in the United States yielding a tax of $350 (assuming a thirty-five percent
tax rate) on its world-wide income, the taxpayer would pay tax of only $100
in the United States if the credit is not limited. This results in an effective
tax rate on United States source income of twenty percent rather than the
thirty-five percent statutory rate.
To avoid this result, § 904 limits the amount of the foreign tax
credit to an amount determined under the following formula:90
Foreign
Maximum taxable income United States tax
foreign = X on worldwide
tax credit Worldwide income
taxable income
This formula limits the foreign tax credit to the tax imposed on the
foreign source income by the United States at a tax rate equal to that
imposed by the United States on the taxpayer's worldwide income. In this
manner, the United States is able to protect its claim to tax the domestic
source income of its own taxpayers. Adopting the facts of the prior
example, the maximum foreign tax credit is limited to $175 ($500/$1,000 x
$350). The taxpayer would pay United States tax of $175 ($350 - $175)
resulting in an effective tax rate on United States source income of thirty-
five percent ($175/$500), which is the statutory rate. The total tax imposed
by both State Y and the United States would be $425 ($250 + $175). The
tax attributable to the higher foreign tax rate is effectively viewed as a non-
creditable cost of investing or conducting business in that country. 91 In
9 I.R.C. § 904(a) (2006) .
91 This effect may be ameliorated somewhat through the carryback and carryover
provisions for the foreign tax credit under § 904(c). The amount of foreign taxes paid or
accrued in a taxable year may exceed the foreign tax credit limitation determined under
§ 904(a). This scenario results in the taxpayer having excess unused foreign tax credits.
Treas. Reg. § 1.904-2(b)(2)(ii) (2009). On the other hand, the § 904(a) limitation in a given
year may exceed the amount of foreign taxes paid, thus resulting in an "excess limitation."
Treas. Reg. § 1.904-2(c)(2)(ii). Section 904(c) provides for a carryback and carryover of
taxes from taxable years in which the taxpayer incurs excess foreign taxes to years in which
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essence, the statutory approach does not permit any portion of the domestic
tax payment attributable to United States source income to be offset by
foreign taxes. From a policy standpoint, this is sensible because United
States source income does not fall within the category of income that is
subject to double taxation.
In addition to an overall limitation on the foreign tax credit,
limitations must be applied separately to certain types of income, often
referred to as income "baskets."92 Broadly speaking, the purpose of the
separate basket-limitation system is to restrict a taxpayer's ability to
average low-tax foreign source income from one jurisdiction with high-tax
business income from another in an effort to utilize "excess" foreign tax
credits.
Assume, for example, that C, a domestic corporation, derives
foreign business income in State X taxed at a forty percent rate. C's total
taxable income for the year is 100,000 of which $25,000 is attributable to
the foreign activity. The remaining $75,000 is attributable to business
activity in the United States. C pays $10,000 in foreign tax. C's United
States tax computed without regard to the foreign tax credit is $35,000. The
overall foreign tax credit limitation would be:
$25,000 foreign
Maximum taxable income $35,000 United
foreign = X States tax on
tax credit $100,000 worldwide worldwide income
taxable income
Thus, C may claim a foreign tax credit of only $8,750, even though it paid
$10,000 in foreign taxes. However, if $5,000 of C's $100,000 taxable
income consists of interest income from State Y that is exempt from tax in
that country, the overall foreign tax credit limitation would be increased to
$10,500 ($35,000 times $30,000/$100,000), resulting in the full $10,000 of
the foreign taxes paid in State X being creditable through the generation of
the low-taxed foreign source interest income in State Y.
The ability to credit the United States tax on low-taxed foreign
income with excess foreign taxes paid on high-taxed foreign income is
the taxpayer has an excess limitation. The unused foreign tax can be carried back one
taxable year and forward ten taxable years. I.R.C. § 904(c) (2006). The Code establishes
the order of years to which the unused foreign tax is to be carried, i.e., the first preceding
year, then the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth
succeeding taxable years. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.904-2(b)(1). To the extent that the unused
foreign tax is not absorbed by the final carryover years, it is irretrievably lost.
92 See I.R.C. § 904(d) (2006).
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referred to as cross-crediting.93 By permitting the cross-crediting of excess
foreign taxes on high-taxed foreign income against the domestic tax on low-
taxed foreign income, the United States effectively concedes domestic
taxation of the low-taxed foreign income to the high-tax foreign
jurisdiction. As stated by the ABA Task Force, "[i]t is difficult to see how
this is in the interests of the United States." 94
C. The Basket Limitation on Cross-Crediting
To limit this form of manipulation of the foreign tax credit
limitation, separate foreign tax credit calculations must be applied to two
baskets of income: one for passive income and another for general
income. 95 Passive income is defined as income that is classified as foreign
personal holding company income under § 954 and, thus, includes interest,
dividends, rents, royalties, annuities, net gains from certain property or
9 See generally POSTLEWAITE & HOFFER, supra note 3, at § 6.18.
94 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 771. However, as one commentator has
stated, the "abuse" of cross-crediting depends on the presence or absence of a relationship
between the high-taxed and low-taxed foreign income.
For those who worry about "cross-crediting," the example they worry about is
foreign taxes on one basket of income offsetting U.S. income on completely
unrelated "other" foreign source income. For those who think that the system
properly permits "credit-averaging," the example is components of income from
integrated cross-border businesses being sliced into pieces that make sense to tax
collectors but not to businessmen. Income from operations in a multi-country
undertaking, involving purchasing, manufacturing, selling, licensing and financing
activities, is a part of a whole. U.S. taxes are taxes on related income. Foreign
taxes on the various pieces are taxes on related income.
Robert H. Dilworth, Tax Reform: International Tax Issues and Some Proposals, INT'L TAX
J., Sept. 2009, at 5, 54. Prohibiting cross-crediting of foreign taxes on pieces of related
income from a globally integrated business will result in unrelieved double taxation. Under
this view, cross-crediting may be justified in many, if not most, cross-border business
situations.
9 I.R.C. § 904(d)(1) (2006). Separate foreign tax credit limitations also apply to certain
categories of income described in other Code sections. See, e.g., §§ 901(j), 904(h)(10),
865(h) (2006).
Between 1986 and 2004, the Code imposed separate limitations with respect to nine different
kinds of income. These separate types of income included passive income, high withholding
tax interest, financial services income, shipping income, certain dividends received from
non-Controlled Foreign Corporations, certain dividends from Domestic International Sales
Corporations (DISCs), taxable income attributable to certain foreign trade income,
distributions from Foreign Sales Corporations attributable to foreign trade income, and,
finally, all other income. Citing the need to simplify reporting and record keeping
requirements for taxpayers, Congress amended §904(d) in 2004 by reducing the number of
baskets to the current two. Although this change created the opportunity for increased cross-
crediting, it greatly simplified the statutory structure of §904.
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commodities transactions, foreign currency gains, income equivalent to
interest, income from notional principal contracts, and income from certain
personal service contracts.96 Nevertheless, a number of exceptions exist.
For example, income that would otherwise constitute passive income is
treated as general category income if it is earned by a qualifying financial
services entity or if it is high-taxed.97 Passive income is deemed high-taxed
if the foreign tax rate exceeds the highest rate of tax specified in § I or § 11,
whichever is applicable to the taxpayer involved.98  General income is
defined simply as "income other than passive category income." 99
Although cross-crediting of typically low-taxed passive foreign income and
high-taxed active foreign income is generally prohibited, taxpayers retain
substantial flexibility to blend high-taxed and low-taxed income of different
types from the same or different jurisdictions in the general basket. 00
The opportunities for cross-crediting are enhanced by the
provisions of § 904(d)(3) under which dividends, interest, rents, and
royalties paid or accrued by a Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) are
treated as either passive or general income for purposes of the separate
basket limitations only to the extent that the payments would be treated as
such in the hands of the CFC.10 These look-through rules are intended to
alleviate the hardship that would result from a strict requirement that
taxpayers allocate all dividends received from foreign subsidiaries to the
passive basket. For example, if a U.S. taxpayer operated an active
manufacturing business in a foreign country through a branch, none of the
income earned would be passive basket income. If, however, the taxpayer
operated the same business through a foreign subsidiary, the income would
become passive basket income upon repatriation to the United States by
way of dividends, interest, or royalties. Thus, dividends (and Subpart F
inclusions), interest, rents, and royalties received by a United States
96 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(A), (d)(2)(B)(i) (2006). See also I.R.C. § 954(c) (2006). The
passive income basket also encompasses three specialized types of income that were divided
into separate baskets under prior law. These include United States source dividends from a
DISC or former DISC, taxable income attributable to certain foreign trade income, and
distributions from former foreign sales corporations attributable to foreign trade income.
I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(B)(v). As a result, some of the complexity of the old law remains since
taxpayers must still analyze and separate these items. The benefit of the two basket system,
then, is not necessarily the achievement of simplicity, but is perhaps its permissive attitude
toward the cross-crediting of high-taxed and low-taxed income.
I.R.C. §§ 904(d)(2)(B)(iii)(II), (C), (D).
9 I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(F).
I.R.C. § 904(d)(2)(A)(ii).
The ABA Task Force described the current situation as allowing "virtually unlimited
cross-crediting, except [for] passive income." ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at
775.
1os I.R.C. § 904(d)(3).
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shareholder from a CFC are assigned to the passive or general limitation
baskets by reference to the category of income out of which the dividend or
other payment was made.' 02 Under the look-through rules, the applicable
payment or inclusion usually remains general basket income to the extent
the CFC is engaged in an active business.
Expressed as an equation, the limitation applicable to passive
income is:
Passive foreign
Maximum taxable income United States tax
passive basket = X on worldwide
foreign tax credit Worldwide income
taxable income
By way of example, assume that a U.S. taxpayer derives $100,000 of
foreign taxable income in State X subject to a foreign tax rate of forty
percent, resulting in a foreign tax of $40,000. In addition, the taxpayer
derives $20,000 of foreign dividend income from State Y subject to a tax
rate of five percent, resulting in an additional foreign tax of $1,000.
Finally, the taxpayer derives $100,000 of domestic taxable income, yielding
a worldwide taxable income of $220,000, which is subject to a domestic tax
rate of thirty-five percent resulting in domestic taxes computed without
regard to the foreign tax credit of $77,000.In this situation, the separate
basket limitations would be applicable. The maximum passive foreign tax
credit would be $7,000 ($20,000/$220,000 x $77,000). Because the credit
cannot exceed the actual taxes paid on such income, the foreign tax credit
would be equal to the foreign tax paid of $1,000. The foreign tax credit
limitation applicable to the general income basket would then apply to the
remainder of the foreign source income, giving rise to a maximum foreign
tax credit of $35,000 ($100,000/$220,000 x $77,000). The foreign tax of
$40,000 would exceed the $35,000 limit and result in a $5,000 foreign tax
credit carryback or carryover. In the absence of the basket limitations
applicable to foreign passive income and general income, the taxpayer
would have been entitled to a maximum foreign tax credit of $42,000
($120,000/$220,000 x $77,000) allowing the taxpayer to cross-credit the
full amount of foreign taxes paid in States X, $40,000, against the United
States tax liability on the foreign source income derived from State Y.
102 id.
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D. The Indirect Foreign Tax Credit
In addition to a foreign tax credit for taxes directly paid by a U.S.
taxpayer, the § 902 "deemed paid" provisions permit a domestic
corporation meeting prescribed requirements of stock ownership in a
foreign corporation to claim a credit for foreign taxes paid by that foreign
subsidiary attributable to earnings distributed to the domestic
shareholder. 103 In essence, the distribution "piggybacks" to the distributee
the amount of foreign taxes incurred in earning such amounts. The
practical significance of the § 902 formula lies in the fact that a domestic
corporation, by choosing to enter a foreign market through a subsidiary
instead of a branch, will not have entirely forfeited its claim to a foreign tax
credit. However, because the deemed paid credit is not available until a
dividend distribution is actually made from a foreign subsidiary to its
domestic parent, unequal treatment between the use of subsidiaries and
branches remains in cases of retained earnings. Finally, the deemed paid
credit might also be seen as an attempt to ensure that the transfer of income
from a subsidiary to a parent will occur through the conventional
mechanism of the dividend payment, rather than the more circuitous routes
of providing loans, goods, or services at a less than arm's-length price.
A dividend distribution from a foreign subsidiary to its parent
corporation may produce both direct and indirect credits for the year of
distribution. If a foreign jurisdiction taxes shareholders upon the receipt of
a dividend from the foreign corporation, in addition to the § 902
determinations discussed below, a § 901 credit may be available to the
distributee corporation as well.
Section 902 permits a domestic corporation that receives a dividend
from a foreign subsidiary in any taxable year to take a credit for taxes paid
by the subsidiary if the domestic corporation owns at least ten percent of the
voting stock of the foreign subsidiary. 104 For purposes of §902, the payor
foreign subsidiary is designated a "first-tier corporation.,105  The deemed
paid provisions extend down to sixth-tier subsidiaries.1 06  A first-tier
corporation to which dividends are paid by a foreign corporation in which
the first-tier corporation owns at least ten percent of the voting stock (a
"second-tier" corporation) is deemed to have paid a portion of the taxes
actually paid or accrued by the second-tier corporation. A second-tier
103 I.R.C. § 902 (2006). The deemed paid credit under § 902 is also available with
respect to inclusions in the domestic corporation's income under Subpart F and the Personal
Foreign Investment Company rules. I.R.C. §§ 960, 1295(f) (2006).
104 I.R.C. § 902(a). The ten percent stock ownership requirement must be met at the time
the dividend is received by the corporation. Treas. Reg. § l.902-1(a)(1) (as amended in
2009).
1os Treas. Reg. § 1.902-1(a)(2).
106 I.R.C. § 902(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.902-1(a).
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corporation to which dividends are paid by a foreign corporation in which
the second-tier corporation owns at least ten percent of the voting stock (a
"third-tier" corporation) is deemed to have paid a portion of the third-tier
corporation's taxes. This treatment is similarly available through "sixth-
tier" corporations.
An additional ownership limitation is imposed for lower-tier
subsidiaries. In order to claim the credit for lower-tier corporations, the
domestic corporate parent must have at least five percent indirect ownership
in those foreign corporations.'07 In a two-tier arrangement, the percentage
of stock owned by the domestic corporation in the first-tier corporation
multiplied by the percentage of stock held by the first-tier corporation in the
second-tier corporation must equal at least five percent. 08 With a three-tier
arrangement, the percentage share held by the domestic corporation and
each tier corporation when multiplied together must equal at least five
percent.'09  Similar requirements apply in determining the indirect
ownership standards for lower-tier subsidiaries."10 The following examples
describe the application of these rules:
Example 1. Domestic corporation A owns thirty percent of foreign
corporation B (first-tier corporation). Corporation B owns forty
percent of foreign corporation C (second-tier corporation).
Corporation C owns fifty percent of foreign corporation D (third-tier
corporation). In this case, both the ten percent direct ownership and
the five percent indirect ownership requirements are met.
Ten Percent Direct Ownership:
A owns more than ten percent of B (thirty percent)
B owns more than ten percent of C (forty percent)
C owns more than ten percent of D (fifty percent)
Five Percent Indirect Ownership:
A owns greater than five percent of C (second-tier) through B
(first-tier) (30% x 40% = 12%).
A also owns greater than five percent of D (third-tier) through
C (second-tier) and B (first-tier) (12% x 50% = 6%).
Thus, domestic corporation A can claim the foreign tax credit for
107 I.R.C. § 902(b)(2). The credit of the second-tier corporation's taxes is permissible if
the taxpayer owns ten percent of the first-tier corporation when that corporation distributes
the dividend received from the second-tier corporation. Treas. Reg. §1.902-1(a)(3).
108 Treas. Reg. § 1.902-1(a)(3).
109 Treas. Reg. § 1.902-1(a)(4).
110 Treas. Regs. §1.902-1(a)(3), (4). In addition, the § 902 deemed paid credit is not
available for foreign taxes paid by subsidiaries in the fourth, fifth or sixth tiers unless the
shareholder claiming the credit is a United States shareholder (as defined in § 951(b)), and
the subsidiary is a Controlled Foreign Corporation. Treas. Regs. § 1.902-1(a)(4)(ii).
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taxes paid and deemed paid by all three of the tier corporations.
Example 2. Domestic corporation W owns twenty-five percent of
foreign corporation X (first-tier). Corporation X owns thirty percent
of foreign corporation Y (second-tier). Corporation Y owns forty
percent of foreign corporation Z (third-tier). In this case, although
the ten percent direct ownership requirement is met, the five percent
indirect ownership requirement is not.
Ten Percent Direct Ownership:
W owns greater than ten percent of X (twenty-five percent)
X owns greater than ten percent of Y (thirty percent)
Y owns greater than ten percent of Z (forty percent)
Five Percent Indirect Ownership:
W owns greater than five percent of Y (second-tier) through X
(first-tier) (25% x 30% = 7.5%). W owns less than five percent
of Z (third-tier) through Y (second-tier) and X (first-tier) (7.5%
x 40% = 3%).
Therefore, domestic corporation W cannot claim credit for taxes
deemed paid by Y (second-tier) for foreign taxes actually paid by Z
(third-tier). It can, however, claim the credit for taxes deemed paid
by X (first-tier) for foreign taxes actually paid by Y (second-tier).
In general, a domestic parent corporation cannot claim a credit for
foreign taxes paid by its foreign subsidiary unless the subsidiary makes a
dividend distribution to the parent. Because a dividend is viewed under the
Code as a manifestation of accumulated profits, it is the payment of the
dividend which triggers the deemed paid provisions. The amount of the
credit allowable is directly proportional to the size of the dividend as a
percentage of available post-1986 undistributed earnings."' The actual
computation numerically expressed is:
DP
§ 902 Credit = FTP X -
UE
In this formula, the § 902 credit refers to the amount of tax paid by the first-
tier corporation which is deemed paid by a domestic corporation.112 "FTP"
refers to the post-1986 foreign taxes paid (or deemed paid by a lower-tier
u1 As regards pre-1987 earnings, prior law is to apply. See I.R.C. § 902(c)(6) (2006).
Additionally, dividends are treated as made from the most recent pool of earnings. They are
paid first out of post-1986 earnings. I.R.C. § 902(c)(6)(B).
112 If dividends are received from more than one first-tier corporation, the taxes deemed
paid must be computed separately for each corporation. Treas. Reg. § 1.902-1(c)(1)(i)
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corporation) by the first-tier corporation, "DP" refers to the dividends paid
by the first-tier corporation to the domestic corporation, "UE" refers to the
post-1986 undistributed earnings of the first-tier corporation, reduced by the
amount of foreign taxes paid or accrued by such first-tier corporation. The
taxes which a first-tier corporation is deemed to have paid through a
second-tier corporation (as well as a second through a third) are calculated
by applying the same formula."'3 Thus, by way of example, assume that
Corp X, a domestic corporation, owns 100 percent of Corp Y, a foreign
corporation, formed in Year 1. Corp Y distributes its first dividend of $300
in Year 3 at a time in which total undistributed earnings (reduced by foreign
tax paid or accrued) equaled $1,000.114 If Corp Y incurred a foreign tax
liability from Year 1 to Year 3 of $500, the deemed paid credit would total
$150 ($300/$1,000 x $500).
When a domestic corporation elects the foreign tax credit for taxes
paid by a foreign subsidiary, the amount of taxes deemed paid must be
treated and reported as dividend income."' 5  That is, the amount of the
actual dividends received are "grossed up" to include an additional amount
equal to the tax deemed paid on those dividends.1 16 The § 78 gross-up
prevents the "overcrediting" of foreign taxes and equates the tax benefits of
utilizing a foreign subsidiary with those of a branch for foreign operations.
When a foreign branch is utilized, the direct foreign tax credit is available,
yet all income is subject to United States tax. The use of a wholly-owned
subsidiary instead results in the availability of the tax credit with domestic
taxation of the dividend income only. The foreign earnings in the amount
of the taxes actually paid would not be subject to domestic taxation. The
gross-up concept eliminates this disparity as to distributed earnings of the
subsidiary.
For example, assume that D, a domestic corporation, establishes H,
a foreign subsidiary, in State Z. H earns $100 in each of Years 1 and 2,
subject to a 20 percent tax rate. H distributes a dividend to D in the amount
of $80, one-half of its after-tax earnings (($200 earnings - $40 tax)/2). In
the absence of the § 78 gross-up, D would be subject to United States tax on
$80 of dividend income, yet receive a § 902 credit of $20, the tax on the full
$100 of H's pre-tax earnings ($40 tax x $80/$160). In contrast, if H were a
branch of D, D would be entitled to a credit for the $20 tax on H's earnings,
but D would also be subject to domestic tax on H's full $100 of earnings.
113 Lower-tier subsidiaries also utilize the same formula. Treas. Reg. § 1.902-1(f) ex. (3).
114 This example assumes taxable years after 1986.
"1 I.R.C. § 78 (2006).
116 The grossed-up income is treated as a dividend for all United States tax purposes,
except the dividends-received deduction for eligible dividends received from foreign
corporations under § 245. I.R.C. §§ 78, 245 (2006). Through this last prohibition, a double
benefit (the tax credit and the deduction to the recipient) is denied.
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To achieve parity in these two situations, § 78 requires that D include as
additional dividend income the $20 of foreign tax paid by H to State Z.
Thus, D is deemed to receive a dividend from H of $100 ($80 actual
dividend + $20 gross-up) and is entitled to a deemed paid credit under
§ 902 of $20.
E. Proposals for Reform
The importance of the foreign tax credit to domestic taxpayers
cannot be overstated. Corporate management and its advisors expend
substantial effort and resources in an attempt to cross credit their foreign tax
liability so as to minimize the impact of the foreign tax credit limitation.''
Similarly, Congress and reformers have devoted considerable thought and
resources in an attempt to limit the potential for abuse which exists with
respect to the concept. Not surprisingly, reform proposals range from
permitting only a deduction, rather than a credit, for foreign taxes paid, to
particularized safeguards in areas deemed ripe for abuse.
F. The Obama Administration Proposals
Despite the overall limitation on the foreign tax credit and the
separate limitations applicable to passive income and general income,
opportunities still exist for cross-crediting of foreign taxes paid in one
jurisdiction (i.e., the high-tax jurisdiction) against the United States tax on
similar income from another jurisdiction (i.e., the low-tax jurisdiction). In
its "purest form," the limitation on the foreign tax credit would be applied
on an item-by-item basis so that the foreign tax paid on a particular item of
income would only offset the United States tax on that item of income.' 18
Because item-by-item limitations would be administratively cumbersome,
the limitation has historically been applied with respect to groupings of
similar income or on a country-by-country basis." 9
The ability of taxpayers to cross-credit foreign taxes on income
within the general income basket has led to "selective repatriation"
strategies involving the deemed paid credit under § 902. Under this
strategy, a domestic corporation will time the repatriation of earnings in the
form of dividends from subsidiaries in jurisdictions with high-tax rates to
1 See generally POSTLEWAITE & HOFFER, supra note 3, at §§ 6.17 and 6.18.
11 JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 76.
"9 During various periods prior to 1976, the foreign tax credit limitation was applied on a
country-by-country basis (the "per-country limitation"), an overall basis, or a combination of
the two. See Dilworth, supra note 94, at 55-56. Although a per-country limitation permits
cross-crediting of foreign taxes paid on different types of income from a single country, the
staff of the Joint Committee has noted that "the effect [is] . . . more limited than permitted
under present law due to general uniformity of tax bases and tax rates within a country."
JOINT CoMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 78.
597
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 30:565 (2010)
correspond with dividends from subsidiaries in jurisdictions with low-tax
rates. In addition, because of the look-thru rules of § 904(d)(3), the
repatriation of earnings in the form of dividends from subsidiaries in
jurisdictions with high tax rates can also be timed to correspond with the
receipt of royalties for the use of intangible property received from a CFC
in a low-tax jurisdiction.12 0 In both situations, the foreign taxes deemed
paid by the domestic corporation under § 902 in the high-tax jurisdiction
can be used to offset the United States tax on the foreign source income
received from the subsidiary in the low-tax jurisdiction.
As a result, the Obama Administration has proposed that the
amount of foreign taxes deemed paid for purposes of § 902 be determined
on an "aggregate or blended basis" across subsidiaries without regard to the
timing or source of any particular distribution of foreign earnings. Under
this proposal, the domestic corporation would aggregate the amount of
foreign taxes as well as the earnings and profits of all foreign subsidies for
which the domestic corporation is entitled to claim a deemed paid credit,
including all lower-tier subsidiaries, in applying the separate basket
limitations. Thus, the amount of foreign taxes paid for purposes of § 902
would be determined under the following formula:
Amount of currently
taxed income from all
foreign subsidiaries Total foreign taxes
Foreign tax X from all foreign
Total earnings and subsidiaries
profits of all foreign
subsidiaries
The report by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation contains
the following illustration of the proposal.
[A] domestic corporation, Parent Co., . . . owns 100 percent of the
shares of each of Alpha Co. and Bravo Co., CFCs organized in
Alphaland and Bravonia, respectively. Alpha Co. has pre-tax
earnings of $1,000 in the general limitation category, pays foreign
taxes of $125 (at a 12.5 percent tax rate), and has net earnings after
taxes of $875. Bravo Co. also has pre-tax earnings of $1,000 in the
general category, but pays foreign taxes of $410 (at a 41 percent tax
rate) and has net earnings after taxes of $590. The aggregate amount
120 The report from the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation notes that one study
found that "almost two-thirds of all foreign-source royalties were sheltered by excess foreign
tax credits in 2000, meaning that no residual U.S. tax was due." JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION
OF REVENUE PROVISIONs, supra note 17, at 81.
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of net earnings and profits of Alpha Co. and Bravo Co. is $1,465
($875 + $590), and the aggregate amount of foreign taxes paid is
$535 ($125 + $410).
If Alpha Co. distributes $500 to Parent Co. as a dividend, the
amount of foreign taxes that Parent Co. would be deemed to have
paid under the proposal with respect to the distributed earnings is
$183 (or $535 x ($500/$1,465)). Similarly, if Bravo Co. distributes
$500 to Parent Co. as a dividend, the amount of foreign taxes that
Parent Co. would be deemed to have paid with respect to the
distributed earnings is also $183 ($535 x ($500/$1,465)). Absent
other factors, Parent Co. would be indifferent as to whether the $500
is remitted from Alpha Co. or Bravo Co., leaving Parent Co. to
decide the source of the dividend based on business needs, rather
than U.S. tax considerations.121
Because the earnings of any foreign subsidiary in any jurisdiction would
carry with them foreign taxes deemed paid at the average effective tax rate
of all foreign subsidiaries, the proposal would eliminate tax benefits in
timing the repatriation of earnings from high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions
within each separate limitation basket.
In reviewing this proposal, the Joint Committee on Taxation noted
several problems. First, the proposal would not eliminate all tax planning
opportunities with respect to the foreign tax credit. As noted previously,12 2
the deemed paid foreign tax credit under § 902 along with the gross-up of
the dividend paid under § 78 is intended to equalize the tax implications
with respect to the use of foreign subsidiaries as compared to the use of
foreign branches. However, timing differences exist with respect to the use
of a foreign subsidiary as compared to a foreign branch since the income
and foreign taxes paid by a foreign branch are accounted for currently by
the domestic parent while the income and foreign taxes paid by a foreign
subsidiary are accounted for only when an actual dividend distribution is
made. Because the Obama Administration proposal applies only to foreign
taxes paid though a foreign subsidiary, domestic corporations may be
encouraged to earn high-taxed foreign income through a branch rather than
a subsidiary in order to avoid the new requirements. 12 3  In addition,
domestic corporations could remove low-taxed foreign income from the
121 JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 80-81
(footnotes omitted). The report notes that "[t]he blended effective tax rate on Parent Co.'s
share of the aggregate earnings of Alpha Co. and Bravo Co. is 26.8 percent
(535/(1,000+1,000)). Parent Co.'s deemed paid foreign taxes of $183 on distributed earnings
of $500 would reflect that blended rate, once the section 78 gross-up amount ($183) was
taken into account, i.e., $183/($500 + $183) = 26.8 percent." Id.
122 See supra text accompanying notes 115-116.
123 JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 82-83.
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new requirements by placing subsidiaries earning such income below the
sixth tier of foreign corporations such that the deemed credit regime of §
902 would no longer be applicable.124
Second, a number of technical and administrative issues would
have to be addressed in order to implement the proposal.125  Most
significantly, rules would have to be developed to allocate subsidiary
earnings and foreign taxes among multiple shareholders in order to
determine aggregate earnings and foreign taxes for each shareholder. These
rules would have to include provisions dealing with changes in a
shareholder's proportionate interest as a result of acquisitions, dispositions,
dilutions, mergers, and other corporate events. In addition to numerous
substantive issues, reporting requirements would need to be addressed
under which information concerning the earnings and foreign taxes of every
foreign subsidiary that would affect the determination of the § 902 credit
for the United States parent would have to be maintained and disclosed
regardless of whether the parent received any distributions from the
subsidiary. Transition rules would also be necessary.12 6 To the extent that
the new requirements apply only to earnings and foreign taxes arising after
the effective date of the legislation, separate pre-effective and post-effective
date pools of earnings and foreign taxes would have to be maintained with
ordering rules for determining the pools associated with any dividend
actually paid.
Third, tax treaty partners may consider the proposal inconsistent
with treaty obligations that require relief from double taxation.12 Many tax
treaties require that the United States provide a credit to a domestic
corporation that owns at least ten percent of the voting stock of a
124 By moving the subsidiary below the sixth tier, the foreign corporation's earning and
profits would be removed from the pool, thus increasing the amount of foreign tax credits
that could be claimed. This would be off-set by the fact that the parent would no longer be
able to claim credits for the foreign taxes paid by these corporations. See Stack, et al., supra
note 17, at 456. One commentator has suggested that the sixth-tier limitation of § 902 be
eliminated to prevent this manipulation of the proposed provision. Nijenhuis, New York
State Bar Association, supra note 17, at 19.
The report of the Staff of the Joint Committee noted an alternative approach under which
the foreign earnings and foreign taxes of both branches and subsidiaries would be included
under a blending regime applicable to the foreign tax credit under both §§ 901 and 902. This
approach was adopted in The Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th
Cong. (2007), introduced by Representative Charles Rangel, Chair of the House Ways and
Means Committee. JoINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at
83. For a comparison of the proposal in H.R. 3970 and that by the administration, see
Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association, supra note 17, at 17-31; Stack, et al., supra note
17, at 455-61.
125 JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 84-85.
126 Id. at 85-86.
127 Id. at 86-88. See Dilworth, supra note 17.
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corporation resident in the foreign jurisdiction for the foreign taxes on the
earnings out of which a dividend is paid. 12 8 Under the administration's
proposal, the amount of taxes that would be deemed paid in the case of a
foreign subsidiary in a high-tax foreign jurisdiction might be less than the
amount of taxes actually paid. Thus, a treaty partner could argue that the
proposal, if enacted, is a violation of the treaty.
In considering the treaty violation question, the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation referred to the text of the Technical Explanation of
the United States Model Convention ("Technical Explanation") which
states that the treaty provision is consistent with § 902 of the Code.12 9
However, the Technical Explanation also states that the credit is "subject to
the limitations of U.S. law, as that law may be amended over time, so long
as the general principle of the Article, that is, the allowance of a credit, is
retained."130 As a result, the proposal may be consistent with United States
treaty obligations because the proposal does not deny a credit, but rather
defers a full credit until the earnings of all the foreign subsidiaries of a
United States corporation have been distributed. Nevertheless, the proposal
is different from the existing foreign tax credit limitations under § 904
which restrict a taxpayer's ability to credit foreign taxes against the United
States tax on other foreign income. The proposal restricts a taxpayer's
ability to credit foreign taxes against the United States tax on the same
foreign income.13 1
G. ABA Task Force Proposals
The Task Force of the ABA also suggested a number of reforms to
the foreign tax credit and its limitations.13 2 The Task Force stated that the
current rules permitting the cross-crediting of foreign taxes has produced a
system that is more favorable to taxpayers investing in high-tax countries
than an exemption system, several forms of which have recently been
128 See United States Model Income Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, art.
23(2)(b), available at http://ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hpl6801.pdf.
129 United States Model Technical Explanation Accompanying the United States Income
Tax Convention of November 15, 2006, 74, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hpl6802.pdf.
130 Id. (emphasis added). The Technical Explanation specifically states that the credit
under the convention is subject to the various limitations of United States law that are found
under §§ 901-908 of the Code. Id.
131 One commentator who believes the proposal is consistent with existing treaty
requirements nevertheless suggested that Congress expressly provide that the provision is
intended to override any treaty obligations that a treaty partner or a court may determine
conflicts with the provision in order to avoid any protracted litigation that would likely result
in the absence of such a statement. Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association, supra note
17, at 30.
132 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 772-76.
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promoted.' 33 As described above, under the current foreign tax credit rules,
taxes imposed in high-tax foreign jurisdictions can be credited against the
United States residual tax on foreign income in low-tax jurisdictions.
Under an exemption system, excess taxes on income in high-tax foreign
jurisdictions cannot be used against United States taxes on income from
other foreign jurisdictions. Furthermore, the current rules create incentives
for taxpayers with excess foreign taxes to invest in lower-taxed foreign
jurisdictions rather than the United States.134  Finally, the beneficiaries
under the current rules are the foreign jurisdictions; "the high-tax
jurisdiction does not suffer the detriment of its high foreign taxes and the
low-tax foreign country receives the benefit of the investment. The U.S.
taxpayer finances these benefits." 35
To remedy the cross-crediting problem, the ABA Task Force made
several recommendations.' 3 6  Along with maintaining the separate
limitation for passive income, the Task Force recommended that credit for
foreign taxes on business income be limited on a country-by-country
basis.137 It defended the use of a per country limitation because the tax rate
and tax base within a country are substantially the same, thus reducing the
opportunities for cross-crediting. A per country limitation would also
provide no greater benefit than would be available under an exemption
system.
The Task Force also highlighted the fact that certain sourcing rules
with respect to income and expenses can be manipulated to result in the
understatement of domestic source taxable income and the overstatement of
foreign source taxable income.138 Consequently, excess foreign taxes under
the current foreign tax credit rules are effectively offsetting residual taxes
133 For a discussion of proposed exemption systems, see Barker and Lokken articles.
134 The incentive created to invest in low-tax foreign jurisdictions rather than the United
States was one of the reasons cited by Congress in 1986 for creating the limitations under §
904 of nine separate baskets. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG.,
GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF 1986 860-62 (Comm. Print 1987)
[hereinafter JOINT COMM., GENERAL EXPLANATION]. See Dilworth, supra note 94, at 56.
135 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 775.
136 In addition to the recommendations described below, the Task Force recommended
that the so-called "technical taxpayer rule" be modified in order to avoid the separation of
income and foreign taxes among related persons. Specifically, the Task Force suggested that
the Service be authorized to make primary and correlative allocations of foreign taxes to the
person who has the income to which the taxes relate in order to achieve an appropriate
matching of income and taxes. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 775-76. The
Service issued Proposed Regulations in 2006 that modified the technical taxpayer rule to
address this situation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(f), 71 Fed. Reg. 44,240 (2006). For a
discussion of the technical taxpayer rule and the Proposed Regulations, see POSTLEWAITE &
HOFFER, supra note 3, at § 6.05.
'3 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 775-76.
138 Id. at 772-74.
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by the United States on income that may not even be subject to tax in a
foreign jurisdiction.'39 As an example of this situation, the Task Force cites
the rule applicable to the sourcing of gain from the sale of inventory.
Generally, gain from the sale of inventory is foreign source income if title
passes to the buyer outside the United States. 140 However, most foreign
countries only tax such gain if it is attributable to a permanent
establishment in the foreign jurisdiction. Because the Task Force viewed a
foreign tax credit as appropriate only when income is subject to foreign tax
in order to avoid or mitigate double taxation, a credit when foreign
countries fail to impose tax is unnecessary. Thus, the Task Force
recommended that gain from the sale of inventory be sourced to the
residence of the taxpayer under the general source rule applicable to
personal property, which provides that gain for the sale of personal property
attributable to a foreign office or fixed place of business of the taxpayer and
subject to an effective tax rate of ten percent or more is foreign source
income. 14 1
The Task Force similarly recommended that the source rule for
royalties from the licensing of intangible property be consistent with the
source rule for income from sale of personal property.14 2 Under existing
law, royalties from the licensing of intangible property are sourced to the
place where the intangible property is used. 14 3 Thus, income from the
license of intangible property used in the manufacture of inventory outside
the United States will be foreign source income. However, if the same
intangible property is used in the manufacturing of inventory in the United
States that is then sold abroad, the income will be divided between the
domestic and foreign source, based, in part, on the place where title
passes.144 Interstingly, these different source rules apply despite the fact
that the income, in whole or in part, represents a return on the intangible
asset. As a result, taxpayers in an excess foreign tax credit situation can
increase their foreign tax credit by separately licensing intangible property
if no foreign withholding tax applies. Again, the Task Force recommended
that royalties from the licensing of intangible property be sourced to the
residence of the taxpayer under the general source rule applicable to
personal property. Thus, royalties from the licensing of intangible property
139 The Task Force also recognized that the converse situation could arise, in which a
foreign country taxes income that the United States views as domestic source income,
resulting in unrelieved double taxation. However, it noted that the converse situation is "far
less common in practice." Id. at 772.
140 I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6), 865(b) (2006).
141 I.R.C. § 865(a), (e)(1).
142 ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 773-74.
143 I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 862(a)(4).
1" I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(6), 862(a)(6), 863(b).
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would be sourced to the residence of the taxpayer unless the royalties are
attributable to a foreign office or fixed place of business of the taxpayer and
subject to an effective tax rate of ten percent or more. Thus, royalties not
subject to foreign tax would not be treated as foreign source income and
would not increase the foreign tax credit limitation. Alternatively, if the
payment of the royalty was subject to a withholding tax, but was not
attributable to a foreign office or fixed place of business of the taxpayer and
subject to an effective tax rate of ten percent or more, the Task Force
recommended that the royalty be treated as foreign source but only in an
amount equal to the foreign tax divided by the highest rate of tax applicable
to the taxpayer. 145
IV. FOREIGN-SOURCE DEDUCTIONS AND DEFERRED FOREIGN
INCOME
A. Overview
Because United States taxpayers are taxable on their worldwide
income, the sourcing of income and expenses as foreign or domestic is
generally irrelevant except in connection with the determination of the
foreign tax credit limitation. 146 Expenses incurred for the generation of
foreign-source income are deductible in the same manner as expenses for
the generation of domestic-source income. Importantly, expenses incurred
for the generation of foreign-source income are deductible even if the
expenses exceed the taxpayer's foreign-source income or the taxpayer earns
no foreign source income.
For example, if a United States taxpayer incurs debt to acquire the
stock of a foreign corporation, the taxpayer may deduct interest with respect
to the indebtedness even if no taxable income is currently generated by the
stock. Although current law may require the taxpayer to recapture as
domestic source income the amount by which the interest expense exceeds
foreign-source income when foreign-source income is earned in a
subsequent taxable year,147 the taxpayer will enjoy the benefit of a current
deduction of the expense and the deferral of the corresponding income. A
current deduction of an expense and the deferral of the corresponding
income can result in a negative effective tax rate of the income involved. 148
145 If this change in the source rules were not adopted, the Task Force recommended that
the rules determining the allocation of research and development expenses between foreign
and domestic source be modified to ensure that foreign source income bear its full share of
the burden of supporting R&D. ABA Task Force Report, supra note 14, at 774.
146 See generally POSTLEWAITE & HOFFER, supra note 3, at § 6.26.
147 I.R.C. § 904(f). See POSTLEWAITE & HOFFER, supra note 3, at § 6.21.
148 One commentator provided the following example of this situation:
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In addition, and as previously noted, the foreign tax credit requires
the determination of both domestic and foreign source income and
deductions in order to calculate the overall credit limitation as well as the
separate basket limitations. 14 9 To the extent that different types of income
are sourced under different rules, incentives exist to characterize income for
purposes of the sourcing rules so as to maximize the amount of foreign
source income and, thereby, maximize the foreign tax credit limitation that
might otherwise apply. Similar incentives exist with respect to the sourcing
of deductions except that the incentive is to characterize deductions as
domestic.150  If deductions can be sourced as domestic, they will reduce
domestic source income subject to taxation in the United States. At the
same time, this approach will increase foreign source income, thereby
maximizing the foreign tax credit limitation.1
Assume that DC, a U.S. multinational corporation, has a marginal effective tax rate
of 35% on its U.S.-source income and a marginal effective tax rate of 10% on its
income earned in Country A by F Sub, a wholly owned Country A subsidiary. In
support of F Sub's Country A operations, DC incurs $100 of interest on U.S.
borrowing and $100 of general and administrative expense at DC's U.S.
headquarters. Country A does not allow F Sub to deduct a cost reimbursement
paid to DC for these expenses. If the United States defers F Sub's income, but
allows a current $200 deduction for these expenses, the result is a benefit of $50
(i.e., $200 multiplied by the 25% difference in the U.S. and Country A marginal
tax rates) until the income taxed at a 10% rate by Country A is repatriated. In
other words, allowing the deduction creates a negative tax on (i.e., subsidizes) the
exempt foreign-source income during the deferral period to the extent of the
difference between the U.S. and foreign tax rates times the deduction amount for
the period of the deferral. Allowing a current deduction for interest and other costs
attributable to deferred foreign-source income cannot be justified on tax policy
grounds.
Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, supra note 14, at 117-18 (footnotes omitted).
149 See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
1o Taxpayers may be indifferent to the sourcing of expenses as either foreign or domestic
source if the foreign tax credit is not limited because there is sufficient foreign-source
income in the limitation category even when the deduction is considered foreign-source or
the expense is deductible under foreign law and the foreign income is subject to tax at a rate
at, or above, the effective domestic tax rate. Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, supra note 14, at I11,
n.107.
151 The sourcing of deductions is independent of whether the deductions are permissible
under the law of the foreign country imposing the tax. If, in determining foreign-source
taxable income for purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation, only the expenses deductible
under foreign law were considered, foreign-source taxable income would be increased,
resulting in a larger credit limitation. This would permit foreign taxes to offset United States
taxes what would otherwise be considered domestic source taxable income. See id. at 111
(noting that the most important expenses for a domestic shareholder that are typically not
allowable as a deduction by a foreign subsidiary under foreign law are interest, R&D
expenses, and general and administrative expenses).
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In order to properly determine the foreign tax credit limitation, the
Regulations set forth a rather complex and cumbersome procedure for the
allocation of deductions. Basically, the Regulations create a distinct two-
tiered method to accomplish this task: "allocation" and, if necessary,
"apportionment." 5 2 The allocation process is the threshold determination
which essentially entails matching deductions to the category of gross
income to which those deductions most factually relate. As a general rule, a
deduction is allocated to the class of gross income to which that deduction
is "definitely related."153  A deduction is definitely related to a class of
gross income if it is incurred as a result of, or incident to, an activity or in
connection with property from which such class of gross income is
derived. 154 Classes of gross income to which deductions are allocated are
not pre-determined. The class of gross income to which deductions are
allocated is driven and defined by the nature of the deduction being
allocated. However, the Regulations give some guidance by providing that
a class of gross income may consist of one or more items (or subdivisions
thereof) of the gross income categories enumerated in § 61.55 For instance,
deductions for real estate taxes on a rental property would directly relate to
the rents class of gross income.
Once deductions are matched with a particular class of gross
income, the composition of that particular class of gross income must be
analyzed to determine whether it is comprised solely of United States
source income (a "residual grouping"), solely foreign source income (a
The proper sourcing of deductions is also of significant concern in an exemption or
territorial tax system under which foreign source income is not subject to tax by the
jurisdiction in which the taxpayer is resident. See PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note
6, at 102-05, 132-35, 239-43; JOINT COMM., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE, supra note 14, at 191.
152 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(a)(2) (as amended in 2009).
153 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(b)(1), (2).
154 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(b)(2). It is entirely possible that a deduction may not bear a
definite relationship to any particular class of gross income. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(b)(1), (5).
For example, certain general and administrative salaries for top level management of a
corporation might not be traced to a given class of income. In such a case, the deduction is
treated as definitely related and allocable to all of a taxpayer's gross income. Treas. Reg. §
1.861-8(b)(5). Such unmatched expenses, by definition, bypass the allocation process, but
are ratably apportioned between the statutory groupings (i.e., foreign and United States
source gross income) comprising the taxpayer's gross income. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(c)(3).
For example, if a corporation's gross income was $1,000,000, consisting of $600,000 foreign
source gross income and $400,000 United States gross income, 60 percent of the managerial
salaries would be apportioned to foreign source income and 40 percent to United States
source income.
155 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(a)(3). The Regulations list 15 of the items of gross income
enumerated in § 61: compensation for services; business income; property gains; interest;
rents; royalties; dividends; alimony; annuities; insurance contract income; pensions;
discharge of indebtedness income; partner's distributive share of gross income; income in
respect of a decedent; and income from an estate or trust.
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"statutory grouping"), or some combination thereof. As the term and
procedure suggest, the apportionment of allocated deductions within a class
of gross income is required only in the last scenario.s16  When
apportionment is required, the deduction already allocated to that mixed-
source class of gross income under the first-tier allocation procedure is, in
effect, sub-allocated between the foreign source income and United States
source income comprising that class of gross income. The Regulations
direct that the apportionment process be accomplished in a fact-based
manner that "reflects to a reasonably close extent the factual relationship"
between the deduction and the gross income grouping.157  Examples of
bases and factors which may be considered in making this factual
determination include comparisons of sales, gross receipts, cost of goods
sold, profit contributions, expenses and intangible costs incurred in
generating the activity, and gross income.158 These possible apportionment
bases are by no means exclusive.159 This open-ended list of bases, coupled
with the malleable "factual relationship" standard, renders the
apportionment process ripe for tax planning.
Special rules apply for the allocation and apportionment of certain
types of expenses, two of the most important of which are interest expenses
and research and development expenses.16 0  The allocation and
apportionment provisions applicable to interest expense are premised on the
oft-questioned assumption that money is fungible, and thus, interest
expense is considered as attributable to all activities and property regardless
of the specific purpose for incurring the obligation.16 1 Thus, as a general
rule, interest expense is allocable to all of the gross income generated, or
expected to be generated, from the taxpayer's income-producing activities
and property.16 2 Once interest has been properly allocated, the Regulations
provide specific methods of apportioning that interest to the statutory and
156 The deduction is allocated in its entirety to the income in the statutory or residual
grouping, whichever is appropriate. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8T(c)(1) (as amended in
2009).
157 id.
158 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8T(c)(1)(i)-(vi).
15 Temp. Treas. Reg. § l.861-8T(c)(1).
160 Other categories of expenses for which special rules apply include income taxes, legal
and accounting fees, stewardship expenses, supportive function expenses, losses on the sale
or exchange of property, and net operating expenses. See POSTLEWAITE & HOFFER, supra
note 3, at § 6.31.
161 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8T(e)(2), 1.861-9T(a) (as amended in 2009).
162 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(a). The interest allocation rules generally apply to any
expense or deductible loss incurred in consideration of the time value of money. Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(b)(1)(i). The allocation of interest expense is generally described at
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residual groupings comprising the class of income. Domestic corporations
are subject to complex apportionment rules depending on the nature of the
corporation's operations. 1 63  Generally, a domestic corporation must
apportion interest expense to the various statutory groupings within the
designated class of income on the basis of average asset values.'6 For
example, if one-third of a domestic corporation's assets are used in
activities that generate foreign-source income, one-third of its interest
expense is deductible in determining taxable income from foreign sources.
A domestic corporation may elect to determine the value of its assets on the
basis of either the tax book value (i.e., adjusted basis) or the fair market
value of those assets.165
With respect to the allocation of interest expense between domestic
and foreign source, an affiliated group of corporations is treated as one
corporation (the "one-taxpayer rule").' 66 Thus, the interest expense of all
members of the group is treated as definitely related and, therefore,
allocable to all of the gross income of the members of the group, and all of
the assets of all the members of the group are taken into account in
apportioning the interest expense.' 67 Thus, each member of the affiliated
group allocates its interest expense between domestic and foreign source by
reference to the total percentage of the affiliated group's assets that fall into
each category. An affiliated group for this purpose is defined as a group of
corporations that is eligible to file a consolidated return under § 1504,
which includes one or more chains of corporations connected through
eighty percent stock ownership with a common parent corporation.' 68
Importantly, a foreign corporation is not includable as part of an
affiliated group for the purposes of allocating interest expense between
domestic and foreign sources.16 9  The exclusion of foreign corporations
163 Domestic individuals generally apportion interest expense based on rules applicable to
the different classifications of that interest under § 163. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-9T(d).
" I.R.C. § 864(e)(2); Temp. Treas. Reg. §1.861-9T(f)(1), (g)(1)(i).
165 Temp. Treas. Reg. §1.861-9T(g)(1)(ii), (h).
"6 I.R.C. § 864(e)(1), (e)(6); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-11 T(c), -14T(e)(2).
167 This rule was enacted as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §
1215(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2544-45 (1986). See JoINT CoMM., GENERAL EXPLANATION, supra
note 134, at 941-52. Prior to this time, an affiliated group of corporations could maximize
the foreign tax credit limitation by having only domestic corporations with only domestic
source income borrow to finance group activities. In such a situation, the interest expense
was entirely sourced as domestic, thereby increasing the amount of foreign source taxable
income and the foreign tax credit limitation. Fleming, Peroni, & Shay, supra note 14, at
111-12.
16 I.R.C. § 864(e)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.861-11 (d)(1). The allocation of interest expense
on the basis of the affiliated group's total assets applies regardless of whether the affiliated
group files a consolidated return.
1 I.R.C. §§ 864(e)(5)(A), 1504(b)(3) (2006).
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ignores the existence of foreign debt, frequently resulting in an over
allocation of interest expense to foreign source income and a reduction in
the applicable foreign tax credit limitation. As stated by the Staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation,
The result is that the allocation under present law does not take into
account the extent to which foreign members of the group may have
borrowed outside the United States to finance their own operations.
Instead, the present rules assume that debt incurred by U.S. group
members disproportionately funds the operations of foreign subsidiaries
and over-allocate interest expense to foreign source income (an effect
commonly referred to as "water's edge fungibility"). The effect of these
rules is to understate the taxpayer's foreign tax credit limitation. 170
To remedy this situation, Congress enacted legislation § 864(f) in
2004 which allows the domestic members of an affiliated group to elect to
determine their interest expense allocation and apportionment on the basis
of a world-wide affiliated group, under which all corporations, domestic
and foreign, that satisfy the eighty percent ownership requirement are
included as members in the affiliated group. 171 Through subsequent
legislation, however, Congress has delayed the effective date of this
provision to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017.172 Once the
legislation becomes effective (assuming it ever does) and an affiliated group
makes the election, the taxable income of the domestic members of the
affiliated group from foreign sources will be determined by allocating and
apportioning the interest expense of those domestic members to foreign-
source income in an amount equal to the excess (if any) of (1) the
worldwide affiliated group's worldwide interest expense multiplied by the
ratio which the foreign assets of the worldwide affiliated group bears to the
total assets of the worldwide affiliated group over (2) the interest expense
170 JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 17.
"' I.R.C. § 864(f)(1). The common parent of the domestic affiliated group must make
the election. I.R.C. § 864(f)(5)(D). The election was originally enacted as part of the
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 401, 118 Stat. 1418, 1488-91
(2004), and made available for taxable years beginning after December 31, 2008.
172 Congress subsequently extended the original effective date of § 864(f) to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 2010, as part of the Housing Assistance and Recovery Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 3093(a), 122 Stat. 2877, 2912 (2008), and then to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 2017, by the Worker, Homeownership, and Business
Assistance Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-92, § 15, 123 Stat. 2984, 2996 (2009). More
recently, proposals have been made to repeal § 864(f) or to extend its effective date. The
Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 3970, 110th Cong. § 3203 (2007) (introduced
by Representative Charles Rangel, Chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, and
providing for the repeal of § 864(f)); The Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R.
3962, 111th Cong. § 554 (2009) (passed by the House of Representatives and providing for
the repeal of § 864(f)).
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incurred by foreign members of the group to the extent such interest would
be allocated to foreign sources if the provision's principles were applied
separately to the foreign members of the group.173 Although the interest
expense of a foreign subsidiary is taken into account for purposes of
allocating the interest expense of the domestic members of the electing
worldwide affiliated group, the interest expense incurred by the foreign
subsidiary is not deductible for U.S. tax purposes. A group's election to
allocate interest expense on a worldwide basis is expected to reduce the
amount of the domestic members' interest expense that is allocated to
foreign source income, to the extent that the group borrows offshore as well
as in the United States.
The application of interest allocation rules for interest expense can
be illustrated through the following example:174 P is a U.S. corporation
holding the stock of DS, a wholly-owned domestic subsidiary, and FS, a
wholly-owned foreign subsidiary. Each subsidiary has assets with a value
of $200 and indebtedness of $100, bearing the same rate of interest. If the
affiliated group includes only domestic corporations, the P group would
have assets with a value of $300 (DS's assets with a value of $200 and the
stock of FS with a value of $100). Because one third of the group's assets
generate foreign source income, one-third of DS's interest expense would
be allocated to foreign source income and two-thirds of DS's interest
expense would be allocated to domestic source income. Alternatively, if
the affiliated group includes both domestic and foreign corporations, the P
group would have assets with a value of $400 (DS's assets with a value of
$200 and FS's assets with a value of $200). The interest expense of the
domestic members of the group that is treated as foreign source would be
the excess of one-half (foreign assets with a value of $200/total assets of the
affiliated group with a value of $400) of the worldwide interest expense
over the interest expense incurred by foreign members of the group.
Because the interest expense of DS and FS is equal, all of DS's interest
expense is allocable to domestic source income.
The Regulations also provide special allocation and apportionment
rules with respect to research and experimentation (R&E) expenditures that
are deductible under § 174. Generally, the place where the research and
development actually takes place is not determinative of how R&E
expenses are allocated between domestic and foreign source income.
Instead, a taxpayer's R&E expenses are considered definitely related to all
173 1.R.C. § 864(f(1)(B).
174 This example is taken from N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N TAX SECTION, REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS OF H.R. 3970 AND EFFECTS OF REDUCTION IN CORPORATE TAX
RATES 17 (Dec. 24, 2008), available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/ContentFolders20/
TaxLawSection/TaxReports/ 173Report.pdf, reprinted in LEXIS, 2008 TNT 249-24.
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income reasonably connected to the broad product category or categories to
which the R&E expenses relate. Thus, R&E expenses are deemed allocable
to all gross income items as a class (including income from sales, royalties,
and dividends) related to a particular product category or categories,
regardless of whether the income in that class is domestic or foreign
source.175 Once R&E expenses are allocated to specific product categories,
a certain portion of the research and development expenses is apportioned
between domestic-source and foreign-source income on the basis of the
geographic situs of the research generating the bulk of the expense. 176
Thus, the most important effect of the applicable sourcing rules is to
apportion a relatively large amount of the total research and development
expenditures to the jurisdiction where the research and development was
performed-a favorable outcome when the research and development is
carried out domestically.
The rules governing the apportionment of R&E expenses between
United States and foreign source income are more complicated than the
allocation rules. Basically, they consist of (1) a specified exclusive
apportionment of an arbitrary percentage of the total R&E expenses to the
jurisdiction where most of the research and development activity took place
and (2) an apportionment of the remaining amount based on the application
of either the sales method or the gross income method, at the taxpayer's
election. 177 Under the sales method, fifty percent of the R&E expenses are
exclusively apportioned to either the statutory grouping of gross income or
the residual grouping of gross income arising from the geographic source
where the research and development activities accounting for more than
fifty percent of the amount of the total R&E expenses were performed.178
17 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-8(e)(3), -17(a)(1) (as amended in 2009). Product categories are
determined by use of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes (i.e., classifications
established by the SIC Manual). Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(a)(2). Taxpayers may divide R&E
expenses between relevant product categories or may choose to aggregate (but not
subdivide) categories. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(a)(2)(i). If an expense is not attributable to
any specific product category, it is deemed to relate to all of the taxpayer's product
categories. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(a)(2)(i).
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(b).
17 In the absence of an election, the taxpayer must utilize the sales method. A taxpayer
cannot use both the sales method and one of the optional gross income methods. The entire
R&E expenses must be apportioned using one or the other and the election is binding for five
years, after which a change is permissible without the necessity of obtaining the Service's
consent. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(d)(1)(ii), (e)(1), (e)(2).
178 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(b)(1)(i), (c). See Treas. Reg. § 1.871-17(h) ex. (1) (for foreign
tax credit purposes, where research and development was carried out in the United States,
fifty percent of total deduction could be apportioned to the residual grouping of gross income
from sources within the United States). A taxpayer may apportion an even greater
percentage of the total R&E expense deduction to a specific jurisdiction if it proves to the
Service that such an exclusive apportionment is warranted. The grounds for such an
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Thus, the primary situs of the research and development activity will be the
source of fifty percent of the total R&E expenses. The remaining fifty
percent of the R&E expenses is then apportioned between the statutory and
residual groupings within each allocated class of gross income according to
the proportion that the sales within each of the statutory and residual
groupings bears to total sales from the product category or categories to
which the R&E expenses relate. 179
Under the gross income method, twenty-five percent of the R&E
expense is exclusively apportioned to either the statutory grouping of gross
income or the residual grouping of gross income arising from the
geographic source where the research and development activities
accounting for more than fifty percent of the amount of the total R&E
expenses were performed. 1so Thus, the primary situs of the research and
development activity will be the source of twenty-five percent of the total
R&E expenses. The remaining seventy-five percent of the R&E expenses
is then apportioned between the statutory and residual groupings in the
proportion that the gross income in the statutory and residual groupings
bear, respectively, to the total amount of gross income.' 81
Importantly, neither the sales nor the gross income method applies
to expenditures required for compliance with governmental legal
requirements; rather, they are allocated to domestic source if incurred in
complying with United States law and to foreign source if incurred to
comply with the law of a foreign jurisdiction.' 82
increased exclusive apportionment are that "the research and experimentation is reasonably
expected to have very limited or long delayed application outside the geographic source
where it was performed." Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(b)(2)(i).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.871-17(h) ex. (1).
1so Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(b)(1)(ii), (d). Again, however, if the fifty percent geographic
source test is not met, no exclusive apportionment will be made.
181 Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(d)(2), (d)(3). This option is only available if (1) the amount of
R&E expenses apportioned to the statutory grouping is not less than fifty percent of the
amount that would have been so apportioned if the taxpayer had used the sales method and
(2) the amount of R&E expenses treated apportioned to the residual grouping is not less than
fifty percent of the amount that would have been so apportioned if the taxpayer had used the
sales method. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(d)(2)(i), (ii). If the first requirement is not satisfied,
the taxpayer may apportion fifty percent of the amount of the R&E expenses that would have
been apportioned to the statutory grouping under the sales method to the statutory grouping
and then apportion the balance of the amount of R&E to the residual grouping. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.861-17(d)(3)(i). If the second requirement is not satisfied, the taxpayer may apportion
fifty percent of the amount of the R&E expenses that would have been apportioned to the
residual grouping under the sales method to the residual grouping and then apportion the
balance of the amount of research and experimental expenses to the statutory grouping.
Treas. Reg. § 1.861-17(d)(3)(ii).
182 I.R.C. § 864(f)(1)(A) (2006); Treas. Reg. §l.861-17(a)(4) (geographic-based
allocations permitted if research and development is undertaken to meet government legal
requirements and costs will generate only de minimis income in other jurisdictions).
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The choice of sourcing rules applicable to research and
development expenses generally mitigate any negative impact on the
foreign tax credit limitation that might otherwise result under sourcing rules
based solely on sales or gross income of the associated product category or
categories to which the R&E expenses relate. Instead, taxpayers are
permitted an exclusive apportionment of R&E expenses to the primary situs
of the R&D activity, typically the United States. In this manner, a domestic
taxpayer avoids "deflating" the numerator of the foreign tax credit
limitation fraction and, thus, its § 904 foreign tax credit limitation. In
addition, as the United States generally requires far more testing and
analysis of new and existing products than do foreign countries, the special
exception tying research and development to governmental legal
requirements also serves to beneficially apportion R&E expenses to United
States source income.' 83
B. The Obama Administration Proposals
Significantly, the sourcing rules described above do not distinguish
between foreign-source deductions that are attributable to the generation of
foreign-source income subject to current United States taxation and foreign-
source income that is deferred under the current international tax regime
until the income is repatriated, typically in the form of a dividend. As a
result, current foreign source deductions are available to reduce current
foreign source income even if the deductions are attributable to income of a
foreign subsidiary that is not currently subject to United States taxation.
This mismatch between the timing of income and deductions creates
incentives for taxpayers to make tax-deferred foreign investments.184
Significantly, the ability to deduct expenses attributable to foreign
source income while deferring the foreign source income itself produces a
result under the current tax system that is better than the result available
under an exemption system.'85  Under an exemption system, expenses
attributable to foreign source income exempt from tax cannot be deducted
in the determination of the taxpayer's taxable income. 186 The deduction of
such expenses under the current tax system produces tax savings for the
taxpayer until such time as the deferred foreign source income subsequently
is taxable. The mismatch of the deduction and the income results in a
" See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 82-11-004 (Nov. 27, 1981) (stating that further testing
required by United States FDA was qualified research and development expense under § 174
despite fact that the product was already being marketed outside of the United States).
184 JoINT COmm., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 13.
185 Fleming, Peroni & Shay, supra note 14, at 116-18.
186 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL, supra note 6, at 102-05, 132-35, 239-43
(disallowing deductions, including interest expense and overhead expenses, attributable to
foreign source income under an exemption system).
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negative effective tax rate, thereby creating the financial incentive for
taxpayers to make tax-deferred foreign investments.
In order to remedy this problem, the Obama Administration has
proposed that the current deduction of expenses that are related to foreign-
source income on which U.S. tax is deferred be deferred until the income to
which they relate is subject to U.S. tax. 187 By matching more closely the
timing of expense deductions with income inclusion, the proposal is
intended to reduce the incentive under present law for a domestic
corporation to derive income through foreign subsidiaries in low-tax
jurisdictions. 8 8 Although the proposal does not directly address concerns
involving distortions under the current tax system with respect to a
domestic corporation's decision regarding when the earnings of a foreign
subsidiary are actually repatriated to the United States, the proposal may
encourage corporations to repatriate the earnings of a foreign subsidiary if,
in doing so, deferred foreign source deductions would be made available.
The Administration's revenue proposals for the 2010 fiscal year
included a deferral rule in connection with all foreign-source expenses other
than R&E expenses, which were explicitly excluded. 90 The types of
187 FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 39-40 (proposing the
deferral of only interest expenses related to deferred foreign-source income); FISCAL YEAR
2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 29 (proposing the deferral of all expenses
expect R&E expenses related to deferred foreign-source income). The Administration's
proposal is similar to one adopted in The Tax Reduction and Reform Act of 2007, H.R.
3970, 110th Cong. (2007), introduced by Representative Charles Rangel, Chair of the House
Ways and Means Committee. For a comparison of the proposal in H.R. 3970 and that by the
administration, see Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association, supra note 17, at 9-17;
Stack, et al., supra note 17, at 452-54.
As stated by the Treasury Department, the "ability to deduct expenses from overseas
investments while deferring U.S. tax on the income from the investment may cause U.S.
businesses to shift their investments and jobs overseas, harming our domestic economy."
FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 39; FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE
PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 29. However, the Joint Committee questioned any conclusion
that the proposal would increase investment in the United States:
If the proposal has the effect of reducing incentives to invest abroad rather than in
the United States, it is possible in theory that investment in the United States by
U.S. taxpayers may increase. Because, however, empirical research has not
produced definitive conclusions about the effect of foreign direct investment on
U.S. labor productivity, wages, and aggregate national income, the proposal's
effects on these features of the U.S. economy are uncertain.
JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 15 (citation omitted).
189 JOINT COMm., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 15-16.
190 FISCAL YEAR 2010 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 29. The exception for
R&E expenses was based on the "positive spillover impacts of those investments on the U.S.
economy." Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Leveling the Playing
Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting Jobs Overseas (May
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expenses that would be most affected by such a proposal are interest
expenses, stewardship and supportive expenses,. and general and
administrative expenses.' 91 The administration's revenue proposals for the
2011 fiscal year narrowed the proposal and included a deferral rule only in
connection with foreign-source interest expenses. 19 2 The exclusion of
stewardship and supportive expenses, along with general and administrative
expenses, from the administration's later proposal may be explained in part
as a result of criticisms that enactment of the original proposal would have
encouraged corporations to move functions in the headquarters to foreign
countries. 19 3 In addition, the 2011 proposal is clear that, because foreign-
source income earned through a branch is currently subject to United States
taxation, the deferral rule does not apply to interest expense properly
allocated and apportioned to such income. 194
One commentator has proposed a three-step process under which
interest expense would be allocated in a manner consistent with the
proposal.'9 5  First, foreign-source interest expense would be determined
4, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/LEVELING-THE-
PLAYING-FIELD-CURBING-TAX-HAVENS-AND-REMOVING-TAX-INCENTIVES-
FOR-SHIFTING-JOBS-OVERSEAS. In reviewing the proposal, the staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation noted that the exclusion of R&E expenses could be viewed as
consistent with the administration's proposal to make the research tax credit under § 41
permanent but nevertheless questioned the exclusion as potentially undermining the overall
policy goal of the proposal to reduce the incentive for United States taxpayers to shift
income overseas. JOlNT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 18.
191 JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 16.
Stewardship expenses are incurred by one company for oversight functions performed for
the company's own benefit as an investor in a related company. They include expenses to
facilitate compliance by the corporation with reporting, legal or regulatory requirements, as
well as other "duplicative activities" and "shareholder activities." Treas. Reg. § 1.861-
8(e)(4)(ii) (as amended in 2009). Supportive functions are those expenses necessary to
operate a corporation but which are not necessarily related to any one entity or group of
entities; they include overhead, supervisory and general and administrative expenses. Treas.
Reg. § 1.861-8(b)(3).
192 FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 39. Unlike the Obama
Administration's 2011 proposal, the similar provision contained in The Tax Reduction and
Reform Act of 2007 would apply to defer the timing of most deductions, including interest,
R&E expenses, stewardship and supportive expenses, and general and administrative
expenses. In addition, the provision would apply to defer the deduction of foreign-source
expenses allocable to foreign-source income earned by a United States taxpayer through a
branch as well as a foreign subsidiary. Thus, the Administration's 2011 proposal is
significantly narrower than other similar proposals that have been considered.
193 Fuller, supra note 17, at 774 (stating that "[tihis provision seems counterproductive if
one of the purported goals is U.S. job creation").
19 FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 39. Other foreign-source
income that is earned directly, such as royalty income, would be similarly treated. The
administration's original proposal did not distinguish between foreign source income earned
by a branch or through a subsidiary.
' Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association, supra note 17, at 13-15.
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based on the relative value of the taxpayer's domestic and foreign assets.
Second, foreign-source interest expense attributed to foreign subsidiaries
would be determined based on the relative value of the foreign assets
directly held by the taxpayer and the value of the stock of the foreign
subsidiaries held by the taxpayer. Third, deferred foreign-source interest
expense would be determined based on the relative amount of deferred and
distributed earning and profits of the foreign subsidiaries.' 96 For example,
assume that corporation P holds assets producing domestic source income
with a value of $1,500, assets of a branch producing foreign source income
with a value of $500 and the stock of a wholly-owned foreign subsidiary,
FS, with a value of $1,000.'" P incurs interest expense of $120, and FS has
earnings and profits in the current taxable year of $100, of which only $50
is distributed. Under the current allocation and apportionment rules, $60 of
interest expense would be apportioned to foreign source income (i.e., $120
interest expense x $1,500 assets producing foreign source income/$3,000
total assets held by P). Two-thirds of the total foreign source interest
expense, $40, would then be allocated to P's investment in FS ($60 foreign
source interest expense x $1,000 value of the stock in FS/$1,500 assets
producing foreign source income). Because only half of FS's earnings and
profits are taxable to P by the United States, $20 of the foreign-source
interest allocable to P's investment in FS would be deductible in the current
year and the remaining $20 foreign-source interest would be deferred.
The allocation and apportionment rules would produce a slightly
different result if the rules permitting the allocation of interest expense on a
worldwide basis ever become effective.'9 8 Using the facts in the previous
example and assuming that corporation FS has assets with a value of
$2,000, liabilities of $1,000 and interest expense of $60, P's worldwide
group has assets with a value of $4,000, $1,500 of which produce domestic
source income and $2,500 of which produce foreign source income. 99
Under the allocation and apportionment rules as modified by § 864(f),
196 The proposal provides only for the deferral of interest expense properly allocated and
apportioned to "a taxpayer's foreign-source income that is not currently subject to U.S. tax."
FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 39. The proposal does not
specify how this foreign-source income would be computed. See JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION
OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 23. One commentator has suggested that
deferred foreign-source income for this purpose be treated as the taxpayer's share of
undistributed non-Subpart F earnings and profits of the taxpayer's foreign subsidiaries with
respect to which the taxpayer satisfies certain specified ownership requirements. Nijenhuis,
New York State Bar Association, supra note 17, at 10.
1 This example is contained in Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association, supra note
17, at 13-14 and 60.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 166-168.
19 This example is contained in Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association, supra note
17, at 14-15 and 61.
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$112.50 of the affiliated group's combined interest expense would be
apportioned to foreign source income (i.e., $180 interest expense x $2,500
assets producing foreign source income/$4,000 total assets held by P and
FS). Ninety dollars of the total foreign source interest expense would then
be allocated to the assets held by FS ($112.50 foreign source interest
expense x $2,000 value of the assets held by FS/$2,500 assets producing
foreign source income). Because FS actually paid $60 of interest expense,
only $30 of P's interest expense would be attributable to FS.2 00 Because
only half of FS's earnings and profits are taxable to P by the United States,
only $15 of P's interest expense attributable to FS would be deductible in
the current year and the remaining $15 foreign-source interest would be
deferred.
To the extent that the rules permitting the allocation of interest
expense on a worldwide basis result in a more appropriate allocation of
interest expense between domestic and foreign source income, the inability
of U.S. taxpayers to elect these rules means that the interest expense
attributable to foreign sources is overstated under the current allocation and
apportionment rules. Thus, the effect of the current rules is to understate a
taxpayer's foreign tax credit limitation. This distortion is further
compounded by the Obama Administration's proposal to defer foreign
source interest expense to the extent that the earnings of a foreign
subsidiary are deferred. The Joint Committee recognized this problem
when it stated that "the overallocation of interest expense to foreign source
income under the present 'water's edge' allocation rules would result in
overstatement of the amount of interest expense subject to deferral-an
effect that could be more costly than understatement of the foreign tax
credit limitation if the taxpayer's offshore investments are located in
relatively low-tax countries." 20 1 As a result, a significant review of these
two intertwined provisions needs to be undertaken in order to obtain the set
of rules that most appropriately provides for the determination of the
amount and timing of foreign source interest deductions.
The administration's proposal provides that "[d]eferred interest
expense would be deductible in a subsequent tax year in proportion to the
amount of the previously deferred foreign-source income that is subject to
200 The remaining $90 of P's $120 interest expense is attributable to P's domestic and
foreign branch assets producing domestic and foreign source income, respectively. More
specifically, $67.50 of interest expense is attributable to domestic source income producing
assets (i.e., $180 interest expense x $1,500 assets producing domestic source income/$4,000
total assets held by P and FS), and $22.50 of interest expense is attributable to foreign source
income producing branch assets held by P (i.e., P's interest expense of $120 - $67.50 of
interest expense attributable to domestic source income producing assets - $30 of P's interest
expense attributable to FS).
201 JOINT COMM., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 17, at 18.
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U.S. tax during that subsequent tax year."2 0 2 This statement suggests that
taxpayers must maintain records of deferred interest expense and the
associated deferred income and that deferred interest expense will only be
deductible when the directly-associated deferred income becomes subject to
U.S. tax. This approach would require ordering rules to determine when
deferred income that accrues across several years becomes subject to U.S.
tax. Alternatively, a multi-year pooling method could be adopted under
which the deferred interest expense accumulated over a number of years
could be deductible in proportion to the reduction in the pool of deferred
203income resulting from the distribution of the deferred income.
V. CONCLUSION
The Obama Administration's international tax reform proposals
contained in the budget proposals for the 2010 and 2011 fiscal years,
including the modifications of the check-the-box rules and the foreign tax
credit and the deferral of certain foreign source deductions as described
above, do not represent the type of comprehensive tax reform advocated by
the proponents of either a pure worldwide tax system or a
territorial/exemption tax system. However, serious debate over incremental
reform proposals such as these may begin to generate a deeper appreciation
on the part of policy makers and shapers within government and the
international business community of the trade-offs and choices that must be
made in order to bring the current international tax regime up to date with
the realities of global business arrangements in the 2 1st century. Such an
appreciation may then make the task of continued incremental tax reform,
and perhaps even more comprehensive tax reform efforts, easier to achieve
in the future as political and economic conditions change.
Incremental tax reform may also be the only feasible approach at a
time when the political system is immersed in other difficult and
contentious policy battles. Fundamental reform of the health system, the
financial system, and possibly the immigration system are currently all
"front-burner" issues, and the political system cannot be expected to
undertake comprehensive reform efforts on multiple fronts at once. In
addition, the tax legislative process itself, at least as experienced over the
last several decades, has become analogous to an assembly line with minor
change on an annual basis and significant change almost as frequently. The
202 FiscAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 17, at 39-40.
203 See Nijenhuis, New York State Bar Association, supra note 17 (commenting on the
original administration proposal contained in the 2010 fiscal year revenue proposals). One
commentator also recommended that deferred expenses should be deductible if reductions in
the earning and profits of a foreign subsidiary subsequently occur in order to avoid a
situation in which the deferred expenses are permanently disallowed. Id.
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machinery for incremental tax reform is in place and operating in both the
Treasury Department and Capitol Hill as demonstrated by the Obama
Administration's proposals and their review by the Joint Committee on
204Taxation.
One cautionary aspect of incremental, as opposed to
comprehensive, tax reform is the risk that an incremental approach may
advance only those proposals that are projected to raise government
revenue, particularly given the current budgetary constraints that confront
the federal government, and that such proposals will be viewed by the
legislative process as largely a means to fund other budgetary priorities.
Presumably, comprehensive tax reform would include changes to the
current tax system that would both increase and decrease government
revenues as policy choices regarding the type of tax system, a desire to
stimulate employment and business growth in the United States, and the
concern for additional governmental revenue are made. Thus, an
incremental approach to tax reform given current budgetary constraints may
be a one-sided battle in which the need for increased government revenue is
favored. Moreover, the legislative process may well "cherry-pick" among
reform proposals on the basis of revenue projections given the revenue
demands of unrelated legislative priorities, all without adequate attention to
the effects that such piecemeal change will have on the coherence of the tax
system itself. These concerns can be allied only through the vigilance of
the policy makers in the Treasury Department and the tax-writing
committees on Capitol Hill who are the parties primarily responsible for the
integrity of the tax system.
204 See supra note 17.
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